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Abstract 
The study investigates the impact of share repurchase and special dividend 
announcements on the share price of JSE listed companies for the period 1999-2015. 
On the announcement day of share repurchases negative average abnormal returns 
of 0.108% were observed. The market delayed by a day to react to the share 
repurchase announcement as abnormal returns of 0.439% were observed on the 1st 
day after the announcement. Positive abnormal returns of 1.213% were observed on 
the announcement day of special dividends. Average positive abnormal returns of 
0.154% were observed 25 days before the announcement. Negative abnormal returns 
of 0.202% were observed on average 25 days after the announcement. The results 
for share repurchases and special dividends were tested for significance at 95% 
confidence level and were found to be insignificant.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and background to the study
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate entities have the goal of maximising shareholder’s wealth. Shareholder’s 
wealth is maximised by reinvesting cash in positive net present value projects to 
stimulate growth (Chowdhury & Hamid, 2005). Profitable projects improve company’s 
performance, future earnings and the potential for sustainable long-term results and 
as a result shareholder’s value is maximised. Shareholders’ wealth is also maximised 
through distribution of free cash flow to investors in the absence of profitable projects. 
Free cash flow is distributed to investors through dividends; special dividends and 
share repurchase programmes rather than investing in unprofitable projects (Lee & 
Suh, 2011).  
There has been an escalation in the use of share repurchase programmes over the 
years and the programme has become one of the most important financial tools of 
distributing free cash flow (Bhana, 2007; Fama & French, 2001; Lee & Suh, 2011). 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) suggest that American firms historically distributed free 
cash flow through dividends but a dramatic shift happened in the years 1980-2000 as 
share repurchases increased 26.1% as compared to the dividends increase of 6.8%. 
Share repurchase programmes have surged due to a number of reasons stated 
empirically. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) indicated that agency cost, 
signalling, market timing and pecking order explain the rise in share repurchases. 
Ginglinger and Harmon (2007) observe that due to the relaxation of laws prohibiting 
share repurchase programmes; a number of countries including Taiwan, Germany, 
Finland and Britain started utilising share repurchase programmes. As a result share 
repurchase programmes have been used as a tool to fight off raiders and avoid 
takeover attempts of an undervalued company (Ejarab, Kimberly & Lee, 2010). The 
takeover attempts were overturned or delayed by companies repurchasing a huge 
number of shares from the major investor attempting a takeover. Abnormal returns 
experienced after the announcement is a result of the increase in the company’s share 
 
2 
 
price which makes the buyout more expensive and more difficult to implement (Ejarab 
et al., 2010). 
Improving earnings per share is also considered as one of the reasons share 
repurchase programmes are implemented especially as a tool to dilute the effects of 
employee share options (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). Gould (2008) added that the 
positive impact of share repurchases on earnings per share would be possible if the 
after tax rate forgone by share repurchases is not higher than the return on equity 
capital. In addition, Lee and Rui (2007) reported that though share repurchases have 
been on the rise in United States of America (US) dividends have not been replaced 
by share repurchases as they are complements. Gelb (2000) also concurs in that 
dividends have not been substituted by share repurchases as the markets still reacted 
favourable when dividends comprised of a high total pay-out ratio. Docking and Koch 
(2005) also reported a greater change in the share price when dividends were 
announced. Chetty and Saez (2005) reported that after the US tax reform in 2003 
dividend paying companies surged by 20% indicating that the tax environment plays 
a huge role in deciding on the method to distribute free cash flow. Moreover, Chetty 
and Saez (2005) suggested that companies were not substituting dividends with share 
repurchases as it was a result of the favourable environment for distribution policies. 
Aharoni, Brown and Wang (2011) reported a decrease in the number of companies 
paying dividends and an increase in share repurchases due to the substitution effect. 
Substitution effect is the impact caused by a company when it changes its existing 
payout policy and adopts an alternative policy. Empirical evidence in America indicates 
that firms gradually replaced dividends with share repurchases (Fama & French, 2001; 
Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008).  
 
Bhana (2007) conducted a study in South Africa to determine if share repurchases 
have an impact on the share price.  In his findings, he indicates that companies that 
distributed free cash flow through dividends declined while share repurchase 
programmes increased in the period 1999-2003.  He states that the substitution effect 
is one of the reasons that have led to the increase in share repurchases and the 
reduction in special dividends.  
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1.2 Background and factors identified from literature 
There were a number of factors that led to companies announcing share repurchases 
and special dividends as tools to distribute free cash flow. These factors include 
agency cost, signalling, market timing, and increasing earnings per share, avoiding 
takeover attempts, taking advantage of the tax environment, free cash flow and capital 
structure (Ejarab et al., 2011). 
 
Signalling is regarded as one of the main reasons in share repurchases and special 
dividends announcement as the programmes communicate the undervaluation of the 
share price to the investor (Ejarab et al., 2011). Signalling suggests that managers are 
able to correct the undervalued share price as share repurchase and special dividends 
announcements lead to positive abnormal returns (Yook, 2010). Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, Vermaelen  (1995) added that share repurchases are a better signal to 
convey managers’ opinions about the future prospects of companies to investors as 
positive long-run abnormal returns were observed in companies that engaged in share 
repurchases. Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2004) also alluded that 
undervaluation of shares leads managers to engage in share repurchases. Lee and 
Suh (2011) concurs in that management announce share repurchases when shares 
are undervalued to communicate to investors that the company’s shares are the best 
investment option. Aharoni et al. (2011) also added that firms undertaking share 
repurchase are signalling to the market that the current negative trend in earnings is 
unlikely to continue in the future. As a result companies, through share repurchase, 
signal a lower probability of deterioration in the firm’s future prospects. The surge in 
share repurchases has led to the reduction of companies paying special dividends to 
distribute free cash flow (Floyd, Nan & Skinner, 2013).  
 
There were inconclusive results empirically regarding the impact share repurchases 
have on the share price. De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed & Simkovic (2013) reported 
a negative impact on the share price after the announcement of share repurchases. 
Almeida, Fos and Kronlund (2014), however, reported positive abnormal returns due 
to the announcement of share repurchases. Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), in their 
study, reported that share repurchases have no impact on the share. The results are 
inconclusive as Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) also reported that there were no positive 
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abnormal returns observed after share repurchases announcements indicating that 
share repurchases are not always a positive signalling tool.  
 
Lie (2000) conducted a study and reported positive abnormal returns on the 
companies that announced special dividends. Lie (2000) argued that abnormal returns 
observed during special dividend announcement are positively correlated to the size 
of the special dividend. Hu and Kumar (2004) reported that investors will prefer special 
dividends over share repurchases when they age as it becomes part of their income. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) concluded that companies that pay special dividends 
consistently attract institutional investors who rely on dividend income like 
endowments. As a result after paying dividends share prices tend to increase as the 
market believes it is a signal about the direction of future earnings.  
 
The problem faced by investors is that the impact of share repurchases and special 
dividends announcements are inconclusive (De Cesari et al., 2013; Ejarab et al., 2010; 
and Ginglinger & Hamon, 2007). If results were conclusive investors would alter their 
investment strategies when the programmes are announced. The aim of the study was 
to determine the impact of share repurchases and special dividends announcements 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
A number of studies on share repurchase and special dividend announcements have 
been conducted in developed markets such as America, Britain, Canada and Australia 
(Zhang, 2005; Lee & Suh, 2011). The reaction in developed markets was likely to be 
different from developing markets due to the differences in size, rules and regulations 
(Lee, 2010). 
 
South Africa is an emerging market and its practices are likely to be different from 
developed markets. South African studies have been conducted on small samples and 
for short periods due to lack of data. Bhana (2007) conducted a study on share 
repurchases in South Africa with a sample period of 30 months. The purpose of this 
study was to therefore compare and contrast the impact of share repurchases and 
special dividends on the share price in the South African market with other studies, 
and to include a broader time frame from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. The study 
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also focused on share repurchases and special dividends on the share price during 
the global recession in 2008. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
The shortfall in the problem statement led to the research question: What is the impact 
of share repurchase and special dividends on the share price of Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) listed companies? 
 
1.5 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the presence of abnormal returns in the days 
surrounding the announcements of share repurchases and special dividends of JSE 
listed companies from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. The study investigated the 
presence of abnormal returns during announcements of share repurchases and 
special dividends before, during and after the global recession in 2008. South African 
investors will benefit from the study as they will be able to anticipate the impact caused 
by the announcements of such programmes. The study also compared share prices 
before and after the initial announcements. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The research study focused on the JSE listed companies that announced share 
repurchases and special dividends from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. This was a 
very long period that covered different phases of the economy in South Africa namely 
expansionary phase, contraction phase and the depression. The period was also long 
enough to eliminate small sample bias. The population included all share repurchases 
and dividend announcements in the period 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. 
 
The study was of quantitative nature as it focused on the impact of share repurchase 
and special dividend announcements on the share price. The Event Study approach 
was used to determine the impacts of the programmes. An econometric package was 
used to test the significance of the results. The research methodology will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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1.7 Collecting and analysing information 
All JSE listed companies are obliged to disseminate information to shareholders that 
might positively or negatively affect the share prices. The dates of the announcement 
of share repurchases and dividend announcements were collected from the Stock 
Exchange News Service (SENS). 
 
The historic share prices for the JSE listed companies were collected from the 
databases I-net Bridge and McGregor BFA. The databases contain historic information 
of all companies listed on the JSE.  
 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
The research paper focussed on share repurchases and special dividend 
announcements by JSE listed companies in the period 1999 to 2015. The study 
focussed on general share repurchases rather than the specific type of share 
repurchases which is Open Market, Dutch auction and Tender Offer repurchases due 
to lack of data. 
 
The results are likely to be different if the research was done on a specific type of 
share repurchases. The study is likely to be affected by survivorship bias as only 
companies that were listed on the JSE throughout the sample period were considered. 
There was also limited data on special dividend announcements and the sample was 
very small.  
1.9 Chapter Outline 
 
CHAPTER CONTENT 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and background to the study 
  
In the first chapter the study is introduced. The background to the 
study which resulted in the research problem is explained.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
  
In the second chapter a critical review of the current literature on the 
research problem is presented. 
    
 
 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
  
The research design and methodology used in the study is explained 
in the third chapter. The chapter commences with a discussion of the 
issues of research design, the methods for collecting and measuring 
the data. Techniques to ensure the validity and reliability of the data 
are also considered. 
    
 
 
Chapter 4: Results and findings 
  
The results of the study are presented in the fourth chapter. The data 
is presented and interpreted in various statistical formats like graphs 
and tables, etc.  
    
 
 
Chapter 5: 
 
 
Findings, conclusion and recommendation 
  
 
Conclusions are drawn on the basis of the results of the study. 
Limitations and recommendations for further study are also 
addressed. 
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Table 1: Chapter outline 
Source: Own deductions 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review
 
2.1 Introduction 
Share repurchases have increased in the past years and have been an imperative tool 
in financial management (Ejarab, Kimberly & Lee, 2010). Fama and French (2001) 
observed that the companies that used to distribute free cash flow through special 
dividends switched to share repurchase programmes. As a result companies’ 
distributing free cash flow through share repurchases increased and special dividends 
declined (Fama & French, 2001).  
 
There are a number of reasons that support the use of share repurchases over special 
dividends in distributing free cash flow. The reasons will be discussed in detail in 
section 2.3 as most reasons advocating share repurchases are embedded in the 
theoretical background. Ejarab et al. (2010) stated that the reasons behind the surge 
in share repurchases include the signalling power to the market, agency costs, 
management share options, market timing, capital structure and tax considerations. 
The literature review focused on the empirical conclusions in regards to share 
repurchases and special dividends announcements.  
 
Section 2.2 will focus on the differences between share repurchases and dividends. 
Section 2.3 will discuss the main reasons that lead companies to engage in share 
repurchases. In section 2.4 the theoretical background of share repurchases and 
special dividends will be discussed. The different methods of share repurchase will be 
discussed in section 2.5.  Previous studies on share repurchases will be discussed in 
section 2.6. Section 2.7 will cover the dividend policy and special dividends. Section 
2.8 will cover dividend signals while section 2.9 covers disappearing dividends. 
Empirical evidence on dividends will be discussed in section 2.10. The summary will 
conclude the chapter in section 2.11. 
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2.2 Differences between share repurchases and dividends 
Share repurchases are more flexible than dividends. Dividends paid should comply 
with a dividend policy set by the company and managers will not just cut dividends as 
that might send a wrong signal to the market that will affect the share price (Butler, 
Cornaggia, Grullon & Weston, 2011). Therefore companies need to smooth out 
dividends in order to avoid unnecessary negative impact on the share price in the 
market (Lintner, 1956).Share repurchases on the other hand are very flexible as they 
can be altered even after announcement (Jagannathan et al., 2000). It might take 
years before open market share repurchases are completed unlike dividends.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the market reacts positively when both dividends 
and share repurchases are announced however they differ in the amplitude of reaction 
(Gelb 2000, Jensen & Smith, 1985; Dan, 1981; Jagannathan et al., 2000). Gelb (2000) 
reported that dividends convey a more positive signal about future earnings compared 
to share repurchases. As a result dividends paid-out lead to a more positive reaction 
than share repurchases. However, Jensen and Smith (1985) found that on average 
share repurchases leads to a huge positive share price reaction than dividends. Ofer 
and Thakor (1987) explained that the difference in market reaction is due to 
information content. Share repurchases are a once off event while a dividend increase 
is a firm commitment of forecasted future earnings.  
 
Share repurchases are paid from temporary free cash flow while dividends are paid 
from permanent cash flow which makes them a better signal (Gelb 2000). Gelb (2000) 
further indicated that firms will pay dividends if its cash flow is permanent and share 
repurchases when the company has a temporary non-operating cash flow. Guy and 
Harford (2000) added that the market’s perception of companies announcing share 
repurchases is positive after announcements.    
2.3 Reasons companies engage in share repurchases and special dividends 
There are many reasons that have been suggested as the motive behind the surge 
in share repurchases announcements and executions. The sections below will briefly 
discuss the reasons. 
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2.3.1 Signalling 
Managers possess insider information than shareholders, as a result due to 
information asymmetry the share price might be undervalued as investors only have 
access to public information (Vermaelen, 2010). Therefore managers will engage in 
share repurchase programmes to signal to the market that the share price of the 
company is undervalued. 
 
2.3.2 Agency problem 
Open market share repurchases are used as a tool to solve the agency problem of 
free cash flow in the hands of managers. In the absence of profitable opportunities 
managers would rather distribute free cash flow to investors than waste funds in 
negative NPV projects. Jensen (1986) reported that firms will reduce agency costs 
through special dividend payments and share repurchases. As a result the agency 
problem will also be reduced through disbursing free cash flow through share 
repurchases and special dividends. 
 
2.3.3 Tax considerations 
Managers who act as agents on behalf of investors have the mandate to increase the 
investors’ wealth (Jensen, 1986). In instances where managers find themselves with 
free cash flow, they would rather distribute free cash flow through share repurchases 
than special dividends to reduce personal taxes on dividends. Therefore firms will 
engage in share repurchases in order for shareholders to benefit from the tax 
advantage that share repurchases bring. In the US the tax rate is higher for dividends 
compared to capital gains (Barclay, Holderness & Sheehan, 2009).  
 
2.3.4 Capital structure 
Share repurchases might be used by managers as a tool to adjust the company’s 
capital structure. When companies repurchase shares, equity proportion to debt is 
reduced and the leverage ratio is increased. Therefore managers would repurchase 
shares when firms are below their target leverage ratio. Chang, Chen & Chen (2010) 
published that companies timed share repurchases to be implemented on the same 
date with the execution of executive share options. Liang (2000) reported that share 
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repurchases were implemented to avoid the dilutive impact of share options on the 
outstanding shares and adjusting the firm’s capital structure. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Background  
This section focuses on the theoretical background of share repurchases. The theories 
covered in the section are efficient market hypothesis, agency cost theory, free cash-
flow theory, Modigliani theory, signalling theory and management share options. 
These theories explain why companies prefer share repurchases to special dividends. 
 
2.4.1 Free cash flow theory  
Free cash flow theory emanates from the agency theory where the principal and the 
agent have different objectives and intentions. Agents are legally appointed individuals 
who act on behalf of principals who are the owners of companies. The agent might not 
act in the best interests of the principal as a result the agent will engage in non-
profitable or risky projects in order to be awarded perks (Jensen 1986). To counteract 
the principal agent problem, Jensen (1986) suggested that free cash flow in the hands 
of managers can be reduced through special dividends and share repurchases. Peyer 
and Vermaelen (2005) added that a strong board is needed that will compel 
management to distribute free cash flow in the absence of profitable projects. 
 
Free cash flow theory emanates from the agency theory where the principal and the 
agent have different objectives and intentions. Agents are legally appointed individuals 
who act on behalf of principals who are the owners of companies. The agent might not 
act for the best interests of the principal as a result the agent will engage in non-
profitable or risky projects in order to be awarded perks (Jensen 1986). To counteract 
the principal agent problem, Jensen (1986) suggested that free cash flow in the hands 
of managers can be reduced through special dividends and share repurchases. Peyer 
and Vermaelen (2005) added that a strong board is needed that will compel 
management to distribute free cash flow in the absence of profitable projects.  
 
Free cash flow is the surplus cash after the company has accounted for its daily 
operations and capital expenditure (Wang, Lin, Fung, & Chen, 2013). Free cash flow 
can be used for expansion, debt reduction or distributed to investors through special 
dividends and share repurchases programmes (Wang, Lin, Fung, & Chen, 2013). 
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Jensen (1986) added that shareholder value can be maximised when companies 
engage in profitable projects by utilising free cash flow. On the other hand shareholder 
value can be compromised if companies engage in non-profitable projects to create a 
perception of hardworking in order to receive incentives.  
 
Zhuang (2015) reported that firms with high free cash flow distribute surplus cash to 
investors when there is scarcity of profitable projects. The distribution of cash can be 
done through share repurchase and special dividends. Firms with high free cash flow 
and cheaper marginal costs will distribute cash to the investors (Zhuang, 2015). Fenn 
and Liang (1997) added that firms with low marginal costs will distribute free cash flow 
when profitable projects are scarce. As a result firms with low marginal cost will engage 
in share repurchases and special dividends knowing that if profitable projects arise in 
the future funds can be obtained cheaper externally. 
 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) indicated that share repurchases are a tool used by 
shareholders of companies to mitigate agency costs. Free cash flow can also be 
distributed through a special dividend but this might create expectations of future 
special dividends (Fenn & Liang, 1997). Fenn and Liang (1997) suggest that 
companies end up utilising share repurchases programmes compared to special 
dividends.  
 
2.4.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a theory developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969) who stated that prices fully reflect all available information in efficient 
capital markets. As a result the share price will always be equal to its fundamental 
value in efficient markets. Fama et al. (1969) added that in efficient markets no strategy 
can earn above average returns on a risk adjusted basis. As a result if this theory 
stood in South Africa, share repurchases and special dividends would not have any 
impact on the share prices on announcements. 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Weak form 
The current share price reflects historical prices and the trading volume of a share in 
weak form efficient market hypothesis. Therefore technical analysis cannot predict the 
future and generate positive abnormal returns (Yook, 2010). Only insider trading and 
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public information can lead to abnormal returns (Yalcin, 2010). Lo, Mamaysky, and 
Wang (2000) argued that technical analysis has a predictive power about future 
movements of the share price and lead to positive abnormal returns. The theory 
contributes to the study positively as the announcements of share repurchases and 
special dividends are both public information. 
 
Kothari, Lewellen & Warner (2006) stated that the positive abnormal returns observed 
around the announcement days of share repurchases and special dividends are in 
support of the weak form hypothesis. In the weak form hypothesis managers will 
achieve the goal of correcting the undervaluation of a share to its true value as public 
information can be used to achieve superior gains. However this is not conclusive as 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) observed the absence of abnormal returns after share 
repurchases announcements.  
 
2.4.2.2 Semi-strong form 
The semi-strong efficient market hypothesis implies that all public information and 
historical information is reflected in the current share price (Hussin, Ahmed, & Ying, 
2010). Fundamental and technical analysis cannot be applied to accomplish superior 
gains. The semi-strong form violates the most propagated assumption that share 
repurchases will be the best tool used to correct the share price (Vermaelen, 1981).  
Only insider knowledge can generate positive returns in the semi-strong hypothesis 
(Yalcin, 2010). However Malkiel (2003) argues that even in the semi-strong market 
efficient hypothesis positive abnormal returns can be generated from irrational pricing 
caused by the market’s participants. Rasches (2001) added that in the very last years 
of the dotcom bubble any company with the name “dot com” experienced positive 
abnormal returns even when the company’s fundamental value was very low. These 
results are contrary to the semi-strong form as it highlights that fundamental or 
technical analysis cannot achieve abnormal returns. In a semi-strong form, managers 
would not be able to communicate the positive future of the company through share 
repurchase as the market would have already incorporated all public information 
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2007). 
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2.4.2.3 Strong form 
The market is in the strongest form when the share prices reflect all information that 
is historical, public and private (Yalcin, 2010). Malkiel (2003) highlighted that share 
prices in the strong form market efficiency are very unpredictable and follow a random 
walk. Technical analysis, fundamental analysis and insider trading cannot achieve 
superior returns in semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis (Laopodis, 2009). If 
the South African economy is in the strong form, special dividends and share 
repurchase announcements would not have an impact in the share price.  
 
Different conclusions were reached when the strong form efficient market hypothesis 
was tested for abnormal returns. Fredriksson, Nilfjord and Peterson (2003) argued that 
the companies that announced share repurchase experienced positive abnormal 
returns. Guidi (2010) indicated the presence of abnormal returns in a strong efficient 
market hypothesis. Mittal and Jain (2009) found that there were no abnormal returns 
due to historic, public and private information. Floros and Vougas (2009) also 
supported the strong form as they found the absence of abnormal returns in their 
study.  
 
2.4.3 Agency cost theory 
The agency cost theory implies that managers of organizations act as agents to the 
shareholders of organizations. The theory adds that agents should perform these 
duties in the best interest of the principals (Lee & Suh, 2011). Officer (2011) added 
that conflict of interests is experienced when agents cease to act in the best interests 
of the principals and engage in unprofitable projects to create a perception that they 
are productive. Share repurchases and special dividends are one of the solutions to 
the principal-agent problems. Jun, Jung & Walkling (2009) stated that the methods of 
distributing free cash flow to the shareholders can mitigate the agency costs as 
overinvestment is avoided. Share repurchases and special dividends will avoid 
overinvestment as free cash flow is distributed to shareholders and shareholders value 
is maximised.  
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2.4.4 Miller and Modigliani theory (MM) 
The theory implies that in a world without taxes, non-existent of bankruptcy costs and 
absence of agency costs the capital structure of a firm does not increase its value 
assuming that the markets are efficient (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). The authors explain 
further that companies that engage in share repurchases programmes increase 
financial leverage and its costs. On the other hand organizations that repurchase their 
shares with borrowed money do not increase in value because the discount rate 
applied in the value also increases due to the increased risks (Miller & Modigliani, 
1961). 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) stated that share repurchases and dividends serve as the 
same signal and as a result investors will be indifferent between the two. The authors 
further stated that the capital structure is irrelevant and that dividends and share 
repurchases could be substituted without causing any effects in the organisation. 
Jensen (1986) adds that the method used to signal the undervaluation does not matter 
as both methods relay the message to the stake holders. The finding does not, 
however, explain the surge in share repurchases that has been observed in finance 
studies (Bhana, 2007; Fama & French, 2001; Ejarab et.al, 2011; Khan, 2009).  
 
2.4.5 Signalling theory 
The theory implies that in a world without taxes and non-existent bankruptcy costs, 
share repurchase are used as one of the instruments to convey the intentions of the 
firm. According to the theory share repurchases are undertaken to take corrective 
action on how markets value its shares and also to signal the future earnings potential 
of the company. Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) reported that managers announce 
share repurchases but time the execution of the event when the share prices are lower 
than its fundamental value.  
 
The theory is made possible by the fact that management is better informed on the 
direction of the company and its intrinsic value than the market (Hennessy, Livdan & 
Miranda, 2010). The intentions of the management on the share price are made 
possible through a credible signal. The signal to be credible must be expensive as free 
signals would fail to achieve the purpose of conveying the message to the market 
(Hennessy, Livdan & Miranda, 2010). Brav et al. (2004) indicated that dividends are 
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sticky and as a result companies would rather distribute free cash flow through share 
repurchases than adjusting dividends that cannot be supported in the future. Share 
repurchases are a once off event and cannot be repeated in the future. As a result 
companies preferred share repurchases to correct undervalued share price compared 
to increasing dividends through a credible signal. 
 
Hennessy et al. (2010) stated that the signalling theory is one of the main reasons 
firms engage in share repurchases and special dividends. Special dividends and share 
repurchase programmes signal to the market the quality of the shares and the futures’ 
prospects of the organization (Hu, 2014). Crawford, Franz and Lobo (2005) argues 
that share repurchases and special dividends are the best signals of manager’s 
optimism if there is a reduction in retained earnings.   
 
Signalling is also considered a very imperative tool because it conveys the message 
to investors that the share price of the company is undervalued (Hennessy et al., 
2010). Due to asymmetry information managers engage in share repurchases to 
correct the undervaluation error (Crawford et al., 2005). 
 
2.4.6 Management share options 
Management share options have been suggested to have a significant influence in the 
managers’ choice between dividends payment and share repurchases (Fenn & Liang, 
1997). The author went further to indicate that managers will consider paying low 
dividends in order to increase share repurchases in a world without information and 
taxes. Managers will act in such a manner because there is a negative relationship 
between management share options and dividends (Kahle, 2002).  
 
Brav et al. (2004) reported that most companies prefer share repurchases to dividends 
as share repurchases increase earnings per share. Share options dilute earnings per 
share while share repurchases are used as a tool to diffuse the dilution. Managers will 
time share repurchases to be implemented soon after management share options to 
diffuse the dilution. Chen (2008) also added that firms will opt for share repurchases 
than dividends as the former increases managers’ wealth by not diluting earnings per 
share as the shares outstanding decrease. This finding explains why share 
repurchases have been on the rise compared to special dividends. Kahle (2002) 
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concluded that firms with management share options experience lower returns than 
companies that do not have these options when they engage in share repurchase 
programmes. This could be due to the market being rational and recognizing the 
motive. 
2.5 Methods of repurchases 
There are three main methods of executing share repurchases in South Africa namely 
tender offer, open market share operations and the Dutch auction. The three 
repurchasing methods vary significantly in the length of the share repurchase period, 
premiums paid to the shareholders and the way the number of share bought back are 
determined. The market also reacts differently to each method used. The three 
methods are discussed briefly below.  
2.5.1 Tender offer 
A tender offer is whereby a company makes a proposal to buy share from every 
shareholder at a given price at a certain period in time. Repurchasing shares using 
tender offer is executed by relaying the offer to the shareholders through the 
prospectus.  
 
The offer is accompanied with the offering price, the number of the shares the 
company intends to purchase and the period of the offer (Oded, 2011). In most cases 
the price offered by the firm is normally higher than the trading price of the company’s 
shares. At the end of the share repurchase offering period, the company will buy back 
the total number of shares offered by the shareholders (Oded, 2011).  
 
In some cases the number of shares offered by the stakeholders in a tender offer can 
be more than the proportion required by the company. In such cases it is the 
company’s discretion to buy all the shares offered or still stick to the initial intended 
proportion of shares to be bought back as stated on the prospectus but on a pro rata 
basis. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) stated that companies will change their capital 
structure through engaging in share repurchase programmes. Tender Offers are 
preferred in implementing share repurchases as the number of shares bought is much 
larger and quicker to execute than in open market operations. 
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The offering company can extend the offering period if the desired number of shares 
are less than the amount offered by the shareholders. The company may also choose 
not to proceed with the share repurchase if the prospectus sent to the shareholders 
indicated a minimum clause (Caudill, Hudson, Marshall & Roumantzi, 2006). The 
markets respond to tender offered shares as the markets consider such repurchases 
to be a firm commitment and the signal might be well received by the market. 
 
2.5.2 Dutch auction 
The Dutch auction method supplies a range of prices within which the shares offered 
will be purchased (Vermaelen, 2010). The invitation is sent to the shareholders to 
tender the share at the price they desire within the range offered. At the end of the 
offer period the firm will create a share supply curve (Vermaelen, 2010). 
 
The firm will use the share supply curve to identify the shares it will purchase at the 
lowest price and the number of shares it requires. If the number of shares offered by 
the investors exceeds the number required by the firm, the company can choose to 
buy the intended shares at the tendered price or below the purchase price on a pro 
rata basis (Ikenberyy et al., 1995).  
 
Lo (2013) stated that in a Dutch auction method the company has an option to disband 
the programme if the shares tendered did not meet the conditional minimum 
acceptance or it can chose to repurchase all shares at the maximum price. The firm 
will execute the share repurchase programme if all conditions are met (Lo, 2013). As 
a result share repurchases conducted through Dutch auction are considered a firm 
commitment by the market. 
2.5.3 Open market 
In open market share repurchases companies make no commitments about the price, 
timing and the execution of the programme. However companies will announce the 
authorised number of shares to be re-purchased at the prevailing market prices when 
the programme is executed (Jagannathan et al., 2000). As a result companies are not 
obliged to announce the exact date when the programme will be implemented. 
Therefore share repurchases can only be implemented when market conditions are 
favourable and it can take years before the programme is completed. 
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In the US share repurchases implemented through open market have surged as only 
129 open market share repurchases were announced in 1985 compared to 1319 open 
market share repurchase announced in year 1999 (Jagannathan et al., 2000).This is 
the most utilised method in share repurchasing programmes because it is one of the 
most flexible methods (Skiner, 2008). This method is used in quite a number of 
countries including both developed markets and emerging markets (Grullon & 
Michaeley, 2002).  
 
There is no range of prices or fixed price that is given to the shareholders but the 
trading share price (Lee Roux, 2008). Costs are also reduced in open market 
operations as the firm is not obliged to compile a prospectus for the shareholders. This 
method is very flexible because the company is not obliged also to announce the 
period of the share repurchase, its volume, price and its motive (Grullon & Michaeley, 
2002). 
 
Bhana (2007) indicated that some repurchases can be conducted after 3 years of 
announcements of the share repurchase programme. Firms might not even engage in 
the share repurchase programme if the share price increases or buy a small proportion 
of the shares intended.  
 
The flexibility of the method explains the reason behind a number of companies 
executing share repurchases use open market operations. The impact of share 
repurchases executed through open market is less than the Dutch auction and tender 
offer share repurchases (Ginglinger & Hamon, 2007). This is due to the fact that tender 
offers and Dutch auction share repurchase announcements are regarded as firm 
commitment by the market. Grullon and Michaely (2004) argued that though 
empirically it has been reported that tender offer share repurchases offer a credible 
signal however open market share repurchases relayed a credible signal in their study 
as abnormal returns were reported.  
2.5.4 Share repurchase legislation 
Share repurchases were prohibited in South Africa because of the South African 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. The capital maintenance concept indicated that share 
repurchases were prohibited because the issued shares are regarded as a permanent 
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fund to guarantee the payment claims of the creditors. As a result no issued capital 
was allowed to be returned to the shareholders as the issued share capital was not 
allowed to be reduced. However the Act considered that the issued share capital could 
be spent and lost in the daily operations of the company but could not be returned to 
the shareholders through share repurchases. 
 
Share repurchases were only allowed in South Africa in 1999. The repurchases were 
made possible in South Africa through the amendment of section 9 of the Companies 
Act 37 of 1999. South Africa was one of the few countries that still prohibited share 
repurchases. The Amendment Act 37 of 1999 permitted companies to buy back shares 
provided that they were authorised in the articles of association and approved by the 
members of the company. The act further states that such an approval is valid until 
the next general meeting unless it is withdrawn by the members of the company. The 
South African Amendment Act 37 of 1999 stipulated the procedure of how share 
repurchases should be conducted. The two methods that are provided in South Africa 
are the tender offer and the share repurchases conducted in the open market. The 
procedure was provided in the act in order to prevent any abuse that might be exerted 
to the shareholders.  Share repurchases could be purchased on a pro rata basis so 
that every shareholder is given an equal share in the programme.  
 
2.6 Previous studies 
Many studies have been conducted on the impact of share repurchases and special 
dividends in developed markets.  Various number of journals, articles and theses have 
been reviewed to determine whether share repurchase and special dividends 
announcements have an impact the share price. The studies previously done will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.6.1 Signal theory  
The most widely discussed explanation for using share repurchases is that managers 
relay their optimism about the future prospects to the market (Ikenberry et al., 1995). 
There are two different versions of the signalling theory (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2002). 
The first version of the signalling theory is to relay the company’s future increase in 
earnings and cash flow of the firm. Due to information asymmetry, managers are 
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sharing views that are not revealed to the market. Bhana (2007) added that corporate 
managers do not need the excess cash to cater for the future commitments as they 
would have forecasted the future cash flows.  
 
The second version of the signalling theory is based on management insider 
knowledge that is in disagreement with how the market has valued the share price 
(Ejarab et al., 2010). Management considers the share price to be undervalued and 
aim to correct the error through share repurchases. This is because managers 
possess insider information and are better informed about the true value of the share 
price. Chan, Ikenberry & Lee (2004) reported significant evidence indicating that value 
and growth firms repurchased shares because they were undervalued.  
 
Ghani, Isa and Lee (2011) highlighted that the undervaluation assumption is logical 
because corporate managers of the firms have superior knowledge about the market 
value of the share and the future prospects of the company. If the signalling hypothesis 
holds, undervalued companies will successfully convey the message and 
experiencing abnormal returns after share repurchases announcements. McNally and 
Smith (2007) reported abnormal returns for all the firms that repurchased shares in 
their study. The result is in support of the signalling hypothesis as it indicates that 
managers can correct the undervaluation of shares. 
 
However Ejarab et al. (2010) reported a contrary view. The authors observed negative 
returns after the share repurchase announcement. Ejarab et al. (2010) alluded that the 
signalling tool failed because shareholders interpreted share repurchases as a clear 
sign of failure to find projects that might add value to the shareholders. Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) also reported that there were no positive abnormal returns observed 
after share repurchases indicating that share repurchases are not always a positive 
signalling tool. A number of studies advocate the undervaluation hypothesis. Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Bhana (2007) and Ejarab et al. (2010) all reported positive 
abnormal returns indicating that firms repurchase shares when shares are 
undervalued.  
 
Ejarab et al (2010) suggested a new dimension to the signalling hypothesis. They 
added that share repurchase programmes can be used as a tool to dismay raiders 
and evade takeover attempts of undervalued firms. The takeover attempt will be 
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derailed by managers when they repurchase a number of shares from the threatening 
major shareholder. Ejarab et al. (2010) further stated that the shareholder attempt 
maybe hindered by the increase in share price after the announcements hence making 
the company expensive to buy out. De Jong, Dutordoir & Verwijmeren (2006) stated 
that share repurchases can only prevent takeover attempts when the market 
monitoring is high. If the market is not monitored, the firm’s managers may not be 
influenced by outsiders to release information and as a result share repurchases may 
not affect the share price. Due to less market monitoring, the raiders may find no 
incentive to take over an undervalued firm because the share price will not change as 
a result of share repurchases programmes. Even though the market does not respond 
to the signals, firms might still go ahead with share repurchase programmes because 
of free cash flow available in the company (De Jong et al., 2006). 
Companies might not be influenced by takeover attempts, undervaluation theory or 
signalling theory but by high free cash-flow levels. Companies with high levels of free 
cash flow faced with non-profitable projects will distribute surplus cash through share 
repurchases and special dividends (Chan et al., 2010). The authors indicated a strong 
positive correlation between the level of cash flow in the business and share 
repurchases. The higher the level of free cash-flow the higher the chances companies 
will distribute excess cash through special dividends and share repurchases.  
2.6.2 Agency cost and free cash flow  
Companies with free cash-flow and without any positive net present value projects to 
invest in will engage in share repurchases and special dividends to reduce agency 
costs (Jiraporn, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) added further that agency costs 
are likely to be experienced by firms when there are high free cash flow levels.  
With high free cash flow levels managers are tempted to invest in inefficient projects. 
As a result special dividends and share repurchases play a huge role in mitigating 
overinvestment and in the process reducing agency costs (Lee & Sung, 2011). A 
number of studies were conducted to determine whether companies that distributed 
free cash-flow to investors’ experienced abnormal returns and in the process reducing 
agency costs (Lee & Sung, 2010; Young & Oswald, 2008; Laporta, Lopez, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2000; Clifford, 2005).  
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Jensen (1986) emphasised that companies with excess free cash flow end up wasting 
company funds through taking excessive perquisites and also through unprofitable 
projects. Jensen (1986) went further suggesting that companies will either pay special 
dividends to the shareholders or repurchase shares to reduce agency costs. Oswald 
and Young (2008) reported that companies with scarce investment projects and high 
free cash flows are likely to engage in share repurchase programmes. Li and McNally 
(2007) observed that the majority of companies that engaged in special dividends and 
share repurchases had high levels of free cash flow. Clifford (2005) concluded that 
free cash flow theory partially explain the reason managers opt to return cash to 
shareholders.  
Jiraporn (2006) indicated that share repurchases and special dividends have been 
used to reduce the agency. He added that through share repurchases overinvestment 
is mitigated as it reduces free cash flow hence limiting the agency costs. Jiraporn 
(2006) went further indicating that firms repurchasing shares are likely to acquire new 
equity that leads to effective monitoring by security exchanges, investment banks and 
suppliers of capital hence reducing agency costs. Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) reported 
that companies will repurchase share or announce special dividends with the reduction 
of agency costs in mind as the primary goal than to signal undervaluation of their share 
prices. 
Nohel and Tarhian (1998) reported that companies that previously experienced 
overinvestment observed positive returns after the announcement to distribute cash 
to the investors. The method used did not matter because investors interpreted the 
move positively as it was concluded as maximising shareholder’s wealth than wasting 
funds on unprofitable projects. Howe, Jia and Kao (1992) however reported a contrary 
view stating that the returns observed after share repurchase announcements were 
insignificant. Howe et al. (1992) went further highlighting that free cash flow was not 
the reason leading to the surge in share repurchases.  
Perfect, Peterson, & Peterson (1995) reported abnormal results after studying share 
repurchases offered through tender offers. They found strong positive results 
indicating that previous overinvestment led companies to distribute excess free cash 
flow to the investors. Lin, Lin, and Liu (2011) also observed a positive significant 
abnormal return in the aftermath of the share repurchases announcements. The 
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authors strongly indicated that the results were more likely to be positive especially 
when firms had overinvestment issues. This is also in support of the fact that 
shareholders interpret share repurchase as good move as agency costs are minimized 
in the process.  
However Grullon and Michaley (2004) investigated a total number of 4 443 American 
companies that announced share repurchase in a period of 17 years. Grullon and 
Michaley (2004) reported a significant reduction in abnormal returns 3 years after the 
announcement period due to agency costs and huge amounts of available free cash 
flow. This indicates that the companies were punished by the markets for failing to 
source out profitable projects. 
2.7 Dividend policy 
Dividend policy is a set of guidelines that managers follow to determine the payment 
to be distributed to shareholders in return of their investments. Dividends are important 
to investors as they are a source of income. Dividends are paid on a per share basis 
and the more shares an investor has the more dividend income they will receive (Van, 
2001). Dividends are not standardized as they differ from other companies and 
companies in other industries (Monogbe, 2015). Dividend policies of companies are 
used by investors to assess the possibility of positive future earnings.  The dividend 
policy that leads to the lowest cost of equity will be optimal and when implemented will 
lead to higher share price. 
2.7.1 Dividend policy theories 
The section below will discuss three types of investor preference theories namely the 
dividend irrelevance theory, the bird in hand theory, the tax preference theory, 
signalling hypotheses, clientele effect and dividend stability. The aforementioned 
theories focus on the effects of dividend policy on the cost of equity.  
2.7.2 Dividend irrelevance theory 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that in a world without taxes and costs dividend 
policy does not affect the cost of equity and the share price of the distributing company. 
As a result this argument led to the dividend irrelevance theory. Miller and Modigliani 
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(1961) further highlighted that the value of a company is a result of income produced 
by its assets and its business risk. 
 
In reality taxes and brokerage costs exist and they nullify the dividend irrelevance 
theory. As a result dividend policy is relevant and it might affect the share price on the 
announcement day. Therefore special dividends announcement might affect the share 
price of the announcing companies. 
 
2.7.3 Bird in hand theory 
Gordon (1963) argues that as the dividend payout is increased, the cost of equity 
decreases as investors perceive the payout as a positive signal of receiving dividends 
in the future than capital gains. Gordon (1963) also states that investors value 
dividends over capital gains as they are less risky. Therefore when companies 
announce dividends policies the market will react as investors’ value them (Dorel & 
Siminica, 2009), and are likely to lead to positive abnormal returns. However Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) argued that dividend policy is independent from cost of equity 
as a result investors will be indifferent between capital gains and dividends as 
investors preferring dividends tend to re-invest their dividends.  
 
2.7.4 Tax preference theory 
Dorel and Siminica (2009) stated that investors might prefer low dividend paying 
companies as they are taxed when dividends are received. On the other hand capital 
gains are taxed when the share is sold. Therefore time value of dollar paid today is 
more expensive than the dollar paid in the future. Taking taxes into account companies 
might opt to distribute free cash flow through share repurchases than dividends (Dorel 
& Siminica, 2009).  
 
2.8 Dividend signals 
This section discusses the different signals that are conveyed from dividends 
announcement. The section will also cover the stability of dividends as it conveys a 
signal to the market. 
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2.8.1 Information signal 
An increase in the share price has been observed after a high dividend announcement 
and a share price decline when a dividend cut is announced. A higher than expected 
dividend announcement is perceived by investors as a positive signal of forecasted 
future good earnings (Ross, 1977). Contrariwise an unexpected reduction in dividends 
leads to a decline in the share price. As a result most companies will distribute free 
cash flow through special dividends as this will be perceived as good news by the 
market of future good earnings ahead. A struggling company will not distribute free 
cash flow as it will need the funds in the years ahead (Grullon and Michaley, 2004).  
 
2.8.2 Incentive signal 
Special dividends are distributed to the investors when the company is exposed to free 
cash flow and there are no positive projects that the company can invest in (Jouhahn 
& Zhang, 2010). Dividends will also be distributed to investors through debt and this 
leads to a capital structure that is heavily funded by debt. Such capital structures are 
perceived positively by investors as companies with weak future earnings prospects 
will not be able to cope without a strong future cash generating power to maintain the 
announced dividends (Jouhahn & Zhang, 2010). 
 
Investors have different objectives and needs when they invest in companies as a 
result they prefer different payout dividend policies. Shareholders such as endowment 
funds and retired individuals will prefer high paying dividend companies while young 
investors might prefer reinvestments. Shareholders relying on dividend income will be 
negatively affected if companies don’t pay dividends. As a result special dividends by 
dividend paying companies are likely to be perceived as positive news and lead to 
higher share repurchases (Peyer &Vermaelen, 2005).  
 
2.8.3 Dividend stability 
Profits generated by companies vary overtime and it is expected that dividend 
payments should also vary. It is expected that dividend payments will increase in good 
years and decrease in bad years. Empirically it has been reported that companies 
prefer dividend stability than constantly changing dividend policy (Al-Yahyaee & 
Walter, 2010). Firms will announce dividends adjustment that they are able to maintain 
and sustain in the future based on the future earnings projection (Lintner, 1956). 
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As a result a dividend increase is perceived as a positive signal of greater earnings 
ahead as dividends are smoothly increased. Al-Yahyaee and Walter (2010) further 
added that investors prefer a firm with a stable predictable dividend policy. As a result 
companies would rather pay a special dividend as it is a once off event than increasing 
dividends that will have to be maintained in the future. 
 
2.9 Disappearing dividends 
There has been a reduction in number of companies paying dividends in the same 
period share repurchases have been on the rise. Fama and French (2001) reported 
that dividend paying companies declined by 50% since 1978 to year 1999. Companies 
paying cash dividends declined by 45.7% from 1978 to 1999. The authors added that 
the decline in dividends is due to poor profitability forecasts and less investment 
opportunities.  
 
Amihud and Li (2002) also reported that the reduction of dividend paying firms is due 
to the ineffectiveness of the information content in dividends. Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) also reported a decline in dividend paying firms from 1980 to 2000. Share 
repurchases increased by 45.3% while dividends only increased by 7.5% on average. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) also published that the dividend forecast errors were 
negatively correlated with share repurchase programmes. As a result Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) concluded that share repurchases have substituted dividends in 
distributing free cash flow. However Gelb (2000) had a contrary view of the substitution 
effect by stating that markets reacted favourable when regular dividends comprised of 
a higher total pay-out ratio. As a result share repurchases could not be a substitute of 
dividend paying firms. Lee and Rui (2007) refuted the substitution effect by stating that 
dividends and share repurchases were not substitutes but complements.   
 
2.10 Previous studies on dividends 
The dividend policy is set up by firms to determine dividend payments to shareholders 
and retained earnings for investing in new profitable projects (Copeland, Shatri & 
Weston, 1983). Companies are faced with a dilemma of determining the profit 
proportion that must be paid to shareholders and the proportion to be invested in the 
profitable projects identified (Khan, 2009).  This study will investigate if special 
dividends announcements have an impact on the share price. 
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Studies have been conducted to determine if dividend policy affect share prices 
positively or negatively. The question has not been fully answered and it still remains 
a debacle within the field of finance as managers, lenders, investors, policy and 
researchers have different views towards the subject. Dividends are not only 
considered a way of cash distribution to shareholders but also as a way of assessing 
the future of the company (Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson & Roberts, 2007). 
Shareholders track the dividend policy through the dividend yield.  A low dividend yield 
implies that the companies’ share price is relatively high as the market perceives that 
the company has a promising future and can easily pay its dividends. As a result 
companies with low dividends yield will possible experience positive abnormal returns 
when special dividends are announced (Boudoukh et al., 2007).   
 
 
A high dividend yield indicates that the company’s share price is depressed and might 
even fail to pay dividends in the future (Andres, Doumet, Fernau, & Theissen, 2013).  
Therefore a company with a high dividend yield might even not make special dividends 
announcements. Dividend yield is imperative in mature companies than in growing 
companies as growing companies are most likely not to pay dividends but reinvest 
profit to cater for future profitable projects (Andres et al, 2013). Lenders are also critical 
of the companies’ dividend yield as declaring high dividends might affect the ability of 
the company to honour its obligation (Andres et al, 2013). 
 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) indicated that investors would not be bothered by whether 
firms pay dividends or the total profit is retained in the organization. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) assumed the markets to be perfect of which in reality the markets 
are imperfect. This warrants the investigation of special dividends being distributed to 
the shareholders as yielding positive returns or negative returns. Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) highlighted that the dividend policy was irrelevant in the world of no taxes or 
bankruptcy costs. Miller and Modigliani (1961) indicated that there were no effects 
observed from dividends announcements on the share price or the capital structure of 
an organization and that the value of the firm is only increased by business risk and 
its earnings power.  
 
There are two different views in regards to special dividends and retained earnings in 
the dividend policy. Joshi (2011) indicated that there are investors who hold the view 
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that dividends will strongly impact the share price due to the fact that shareholders 
prefer current payments than the delayed payments. The author also indicated that 
special dividend payments to shareholders are also an indication of positive earnings 
in the future. As a result Joshi (2011) indicates that special dividends announcements 
should lead to positive abnormal returns on the days surrounding the announcement. 
Dennis and Osobov (2008) stated that special dividends will impact share prices 
negatively due to the fact that shareholders treat retained earnings as an indicator of 
future profitable projects that the company plans to invest in. As a result shareholders 
perceive profitable future years and would rather support retained earnings instead of 
special dividends. Dennis and Osobov (2008) went further indicating that the 
shareholders will experience tax advantages in retained earnings as retained earnings 
are not considered income until they have been realised. 
 
Black and Scholes (1974) conducted a study on the impact of dividend policy on the 
share price between the years 1966 to 1974. In order to test the relationship between 
the dividend yield and the expected returns, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was 
used and an insignificant relationship was observed. It was concluded that dividend 
policies do not impact the share price and dividend irrelevance theory is valid (Miller 
& Modigliani, 1961). Chowdhurry and Uddin (2005) emphasized the dividend policy 
irrelevance theory by investigating 137 Dhaka listed stock exchange companies to 
determine the association between dividend payments and share prices. Chowdhurry 
and Uddin (2005) reported that dividend announcements do not increase the share 
price. The result is in support of the dividend irrelevance theory. 
 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) supplied a different view of the MM theory. The authors 
studied 200 firms in German to determine the association between dividends and the 
share price. Amihud and Murgia (1997) reported positive abnormal returns of 0.965 
when firms announced dividends increases. Amihud and Murgia (1997) also reported 
that when firms reported dividends cuts companies experienced negative abnormal 
returns of 1.73. These results indicate that dividends affect the share prices. This might 
also suggest that dividends increases or decreases act as a tool to signal the future 
years of companies.  
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Monogbe (2015) supported the signalling power of dividends in financial markets. 
Monogbe (2015) studied Nigerian companies that distributed free cash flow through 
cash dividends. Monogbe (2015) observed abnormal returns indicating the presence 
of the signalling hypothesis in both cash dividends and dividend increase events. 
D’Souza and Saxena (1999) focused on the association between the dividend policy 
and the agency costs theory. The author investigated 333 companies listed on the 
New York Stock exchange for the period 1981 to 1990. D’Souza and Saxena (1999) 
reported significant negative relationship between insider ownership and dividend pay-
out. The results indicate that agency cost theory plays a huge role in dividends pay-
outs. Chen and Dhiensiri (1999) studied Indian companies between the period 1991 
to 1999 to determine whether the association between dividends pay-outs and insider 
ownership was existent. They reported a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and dividends pay-out. The findings were in support of the agency cost 
theory.  
 
2.10.1 Impact of special dividends on share price 
Lie (2000) focused on the impact special dividends have on the share price of 
companies. The author analysed 570 special dividends, 7 417 regular dividends and 
207 share repurchases conducted through tender offers and observed the impact of 
the events.  The author highlighted that all companies that distributed cash to the 
investors in the study had high levels of free cash flow. 
 
 Lie (2000) reported positive abnormal returns on the companies that announced 
special dividends. The author further indicated that of all the three segments under 
study, share repurchases through tender offer and special dividends yielded higher 
abnormal returns compared to regular dividends. The favourable response is a result 
of the companies experiencing agency costs and such a move is interpreted by the 
market as noble than to invest in unprofitable markets (Lie, 2000). Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) reported positive abnormal returns around the announcements of 
regular dividend increases. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) reported positive results 
because most of the companies in the sample were over investing and shareholders 
interpreted such a decision as good news. However Howe et al. (1992) reported 
results that were contrary to the previous researchers as his conclusions were 
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insignificant. Howe et al. (1992) concluded that agency costs and free cash flow 
hypotheses in special dividends do not lead to abnormal returns.  
 
Denis and Osobov (2007) focused on the relations between the cash flow 
characteristics and the announcement by companies that a special dividend will be 
declared to the shareholders. The authors found positive abnormal returns due to the 
fact that the companies had overinvested. The authors used the Tobin q in order to 
determine the effects of cash flow in the share buy-backs programme. Denis and 
Osobov (2007) also indicated that companies that suffered from underinvestment 
experienced negative returns during the announcement of special dividend. Yoon and 
Starks (1995) also reported similar observations as they observed that companies with 
no free cash flow did not respond to dividends special announcement. The majority of 
studies as indicated above indicates that companies announcing special dividends are 
likely to experience abnormal returns during the days of the announcement period.  
 
2.10.2 Comparison: Developed markets versus Emerging Markets 
Developed markets tend to differ in structural components as compared to the 
emerging markets. Developed markets are well developed in terms of technology, data 
availability, and the markets tend to be continuous unlike some of the markets in the 
emerging markets. The differences in these markets can lead to different conclusions 
that will be valuable to the investors. A number of studies in America report positive 
abnormal returns during announcement days of the event. Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2005) reported abnormal returns of 3.53% in American companies that announced 
share repurchases. An Italian study reported positive abnormal returns confirming the 
signalling theory that share repurchases convey messages about future good days. 
 
A number of studies were also conducted in India, a country that is classified as an 
emerging market. India is also a member of the BRICS, a block of emerging markets 
countries. Mohanty (2002) focused on a very small sample of 12 announcements. 
Mohanty (2002) found cumulated average abnormal returns of 3.86%. The sample 
used in the study was very small and it could have influenced the results of the study. 
As a result Kaur and Simgh (2003) studied a larger sample by considering 77 
announcements of share repurchase. The authors observed positive abnormal returns 
of 1.5% during the announcement day. 
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A number of studies have been conducted in comparing the effects dividends and 
retained earnings have on the share price. Most of the results reported in the literature 
indicate that dividends have a more positive impact on the share price as compared 
to the retained earnings hence supporting the signalling hypothesis. Khan (2009) 
indicated that dividends had a positive relationship with the market share. Pradhan 
(2003) also reported that the dividends announcement yielded positive results as 
compared to retained earnings. The author went further in highlighting that retained 
earnings had a very weak impact if not close to none. The author went further 
indicating that dividends yielded positive results because of the information they are 
conveying in the markets. 
 
Chhetri (2008) conducted a study in India by comparing high dividend paying 
companies and low dividend paying companies. The author indicated that there is a 
positive relationship between dividends and the share price. Chhetri (2008) concluded 
that dividends convey information to the markets that is valuable about the future. 
 
Hyderabad (2009) focused on 70 share repurchase announcements and reported a 
different result. The author observed 2.771% abnormal returns during the days 
surrounding the announcements and that these abnormal returns are short lived as 
share prices fall back to their normal levels. These results indicate that during the days 
surrounding the announcements the firms’ experience positive abnormal returns. A 
study will be done in South Africa to determine if the results are different from the 
Indian market. 
 
2.10.3 South African studies 
Most of the special dividends and share repurchases studies were done in developed 
markets such as America and the rest of Europe. The results from the international 
studies are inconclusive as some studies reported positive gains, negative returns and 
zero returns in the announcements of share repurchases and special dividends. The 
results of these studies might not be applicable to the emerging markets. This could 
be the fact that in emerging markets the exchanges are not as organized as in the 
developed markets. Lack of data could also lead to different results in the emerging 
markets. 
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Bhana (2007) focused on the companies that announced share repurchases listed in 
the JSE between year 2000 and 2003. Bhana (2007) observed the reaction of the 
market for a 40 day period; 20 days before the share repurchase announcement and 
20 days after the announcement. Bhana (2007) reported positive abnormal returns of 
4.38% in the time of the initial announcement. 
 
The evidence of the study conducted in South Africa was in support of the Signalling 
theory. However the results should be treated with care as the sample was very small 
and it covered a 30 month period. Bhana (2007) analysed only 117 companies that 
were included in the final sample.  
 
Potgieter (2015) conducted a study on JSE listed companies on whether management 
repurchase shares when the shares are undervalued. Potgieter (2015) considered a 
sample of 183 share repurchase announcements from 83 JSE listed companies. She 
reported that managers strategically time share repurchases as insider information 
indicates that announcements were made when shares are undervalued. She further 
stated that management would return excess cash to shareholders regardless of 
whether shares are undervalued. The time period was long enough, however the 
sample was fairly small. 
 
Brijlal and Punwasi (2016) focused on market reactions on JSE listed companies that 
announced share repurchase from the period 2003 to 2012. A final sample of 167 
share repurchase announcements from 62 companies was considered. Significant 
abnormal returns of 0.46% and cumulative abnormal returns of 3.81% were reported. 
However, the authors found that the ability of managers to time their share 
repurchases were insignificant. The study excluded the initial years after share 
repurchase were legalised in South Africa. 
 
This study improved the sample and covered a period of 15 years from 1999 to 2015. 
The study will add value as the period understudy experienced a global recession and 
results will be compared with the rest of the studies in the finance literature. Empirically 
it was observed that the signalling theory is considered as the most dominant reason 
behind share repurchases. It should be noted however that there were studies that did 
not support the signalling theory as a result further studies should be conducted.   
 
 
35 
 
 
2.11 Summary 
As indicated above there are many theories that lead companies to engage into share 
repurchase programmes and special dividends. Agency cost, signalling, management 
share options and free cash flow theories were discussed in detail and how they 
affected the share price. The literature examined does not suggest that share 
repurchase programmes have replaced dividend payments as all methods of cash 
distribution still affect the markets. 
 
There are inconclusive results on the impact of share repurchases and special 
dividends on the share price. Based on the literature examined, it was found that most 
countries in emerging markets exhibit positive abnormal returns during the 
announcement days of share repurchases and special dividends. South African 
studies were examined and they also indicated inconclusive results on the effects of 
share repurchase and special dividends on the share price. This research paper added 
value to the existing literature by focusing on share repurchases from the day they 
were legalised in South Africa in October 1999 to the 30th of June 2015. The study 
also focused on special dividends on the same period and the results were compared.  
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Chapter 3 
Research methodology
 
3.1 Introduction 
This section will outline the research approach that will be applied in gathering data, 
analysis of data and the results generated from the study. The Event Study method 
will be discussed at length as it is the best suitable method for analysing share 
repurchase and dividends announcements as they are once off events (Zhang, 2005; 
Bhana, 2007; Chang, Chen, & Chen, 2010). 
 
The study was of a quantitative nature because of the type of research conducted on 
share repurchases and special dividends announcements. An econometric package 
and the critical values was used to test the significance of the hypotheses indicated 
below.  
H0: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) = 0 in share repurchase announcement days 
H1: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) ≠ 0 in share repurchase announcement days 
 
H0: Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) = 0 in share repurchase 
announcement days  
H1: Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) ≠ 0 in share repurchase 
announcement days 
 
H0: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) = 0 in Special dividend announcement days 
H1: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) = 0 in Special dividend announcement days 
 
H0: Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) = 0 in Special dividend 
announcement days 
H1: Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) = 0 in Special dividend 
announcement days 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing (CAPM) model was applied in calculating abnormal returns. 
The model will be discussed in detail below. The abnormal returns were tested for 
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significance by using the paired sample test as it is the appropriate in calculating and 
observing the impact of events. The study was based on secondary data. This 
information was obtained from the existing databases of the JSE, I-net Bridge and 
McGregor BFA. The study covered a 15 year period from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 
2015. The next section will focus on the research questions considered in the study. 
 
3.2 Research question 
The research study attempted to answer the following question: What is the impact of 
share repurchase and special dividends on the share price of Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) listed companies?  
 
3.2.1 Research objectives 
The objective of the study was to evaluate the presence of abnormal returns in the 
days surrounding the announcements of share repurchases and special dividends of 
JSE listed companies.  
The study investigated the presence of abnormal returns during announcements of 
share repurchases and special dividends during the global recession of 2008. South 
African investors will benefit from the study as they will be able to anticipate the impact 
caused by the announcements of such programmes. The study also compared share 
prices before and after the initial announcements. South African studies have been 
conducted on small samples and for short periods, the longest period was recorded at 
30 months (Bhana, 2007).  The study covered share repurchases and special 
dividends for a period of 15 years and 9 months.  
3.3 Research strategy 
3.3.2 Research paradigm 
The research paper was of a quantitative nature as it focused on the impact of share 
repurchases and special dividends in South Africa. Econometric package and critical 
values were applied to draw conclusions and how significant the results are. Statistical 
models for non-parametric data were applied for both share repurchase 
announcements and special dividends announcements. 
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3.3.2 Research method 
The research gathered historical share prices for the JSE listed companies through I-
net Bridge and McGregor BFA data bases. All JSE listed companies are obliged to 
announce any material information that is likely to impact on the share price. Material 
information for JSE listed companies is recorded in SENS and the announcement 
dates of the events were collected from SENS. Historical share prices were collected 
for 51 days for each event. 
 
3.4 Research instrument 
The research study used the event study technique to determine the impact of share 
repurchase and special dividends on the share price. The method focussed on the 
performance of shares before the announcement and after the announcement. The 
critical levels and p-values were calculated to draw the conclusions. 
 
3.5 Sampling strategy 
This section will focus on the target population and the sample selection. Sample 
selection will be discussed in detail below in section 3.5.2. 
 
3.5.1 Target population 
Share repurchases were only allowed in South Africa in October 1999. The research 
covered all share repurchase and special dividend announcements from the period 1 
October 1999 to 30 June 2015 on a daily time series. This period was used also to 
study the impact of share repurchases and special dividend announcements on the 
share price. As a result the population included all share repurchases and dividends 
announced in the study period for JSE listed companies. 
 
The 15 year period was selected for a number of reasons.  Firstly the data needed to 
test the presence of abnormal returns in share repurchase announcements is readily 
available from October as share repurchases were only allowed in South Africa in 
October 1999. Secondly the scholarly study that could be found in South African 
market was done by Bhana (2007) and it covered a very short period.  As a result the 
study investigated the 15 year period from the beginning of the millennium to 
determine if the results will be different.  
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Thirdly the period was long enough not to be swayed by small sample bias when 
conducting research. Finally the period was long enough as it includes the different 
phases of the economic cycles in South Africa and on the international stage. The 
South African economy experienced periods of expansion, recession and periods of 
very slow growth. The global market experienced a recession that affected South 
Africa due to subprime lending. As a result the study most likely supply unbiased 
results that resembled the markets at large with different economic phases. The 
population included share repurchases and special dividend announcements that 
were announced by JSE listed companies. This included all announcements 
regardless of whether share repurchases were actually conducted after the 
announcement or not. It was a different case with dividend announcements because 
after the announcement, payments should be remitted to the shareholders of the 
company. As a result all dividend announcements in the period mentioned formulated 
the target population. 
 
3.5.2 Sample selection 
Non-probability sampling was used in the study because of the limited data in the 
South African market. Subjective judgement was used to produce the best sample as 
probability sampling might lead to selecting companies with no continuous data in its 
trading. In probability sampling all units in the population have an equal chance of 
being selected.  
Probability sampling might also lead to the selection of companies that had a lot of 
material announcements close to the event which might prove to be difficult in 
ascertaining the impact of share repurchase announcements and dividends 
announcements on the share price. Finally probability sampling could lead to a 
selection of companies that delisted ion the JSE. Bhana (2007) added guidelines that 
will assist in generating a representative sample.  The guidelines are as follows: 
 There must not have been any other major announcements from the company 
30 days prior to the announcement and 30 days after the announcements of 
special dividends and share repurchases. Any other major announcements 
would make it difficult to trace the reaction of the share price to share 
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repurchases. As a result share repurchase announcements analysis will be 
erroneous. 
 The company must have available data of the daily share price 200 days before 
the announcement and 25 days after the announcement. 
 The company must not reduce dividends during the announcement year of 
share repurchases. The main reason for excluding such companies is to 
eliminate the notion that companies are substituting share repurchases for 
dividends (Grullon and Michaeley, 2002); and 
 The companies that delisted in the period will be excluded in generating the 
sample as only JSE listed companies till the end of the period will be included 
and generate better comparable results. The companies were excluded as the 
sample should be a representative of JSE listed companies. 
3.5.3 Data collection method 
The study focused on the companies listed on the JSE. As a result all companies listed 
on the JSE are obligated to inform shareholders of any material information that might 
cause movement in the company’s share price. Such information is made available by 
the SENS. SENS was used to gather the announcements dates of share repurchases 
and special dividends made by companies (Bhana, 2007; Rasches, 2001; Kothari et 
al., 2006; Chivaka, Bayne, Siddle,  Cairney & Shev, 2009).  
 
When the announcements dates were determined, the historical share price of the 
companies was collected from JSE through I-net Bridge and McGregor BFA 
databases. These two databases have been largely used in South Africa by Chivaka 
et al. (2009); Halfar and Ward (2011) to collect verifiable data for research purposes. 
I-net Bridge and Mcgregor BFA have been largely preferred for easy access and 
simplicity in collection of data. As a result all closing share prices for the study period 
1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015 were collected through these data bases. 
 
3.6.1 Event study 
Event Study is a tool that has been and is still used in academic studies in determining 
the impacts of different events on the share price. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) 
highlighted that the method is preferred because of its simplicity in observing the 
impact of announcements on the share price. The technique only requires historic 
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prices, the date of the announcement and the name of the company. The method is 
also reliable because it does not use accounting data that might be manipulated by 
accountants to meet their expectations. The method applies the data it obtains from 
the market hence making it more reliable.  
 
The Event Study method is used to measure three different impacts on a 
phenomenon. When financial markets are efficient, event studies are used to evaluate 
the speed of the impact and the market’s reaction. The second scenario where the 
event study method is applied is where researchers are evaluating the impact of new 
information on the firm’s returns. The research study will focus on the second type as 
it is relevant to the study conducted. The efficient market hypotheses indicate that the 
impact of an event in the market will eventually be reflected in the share price. Event 
study methodology is an answer to solve such issues by measuring the impact of the 
events to determine whether positive or abnormal returns were experienced as a result 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 
The event study methodology dates back to 1969 as Fama et al. (1969) made the 
primary presentation of the event study methodology. They used the methodology to 
ascertain the impact of the share splits announcements on the share price. Since then 
event studies have been used as an essential tool in the analysis of material 
announcements on share prices of organizations (Seiler, 2000). There have been 
some significant suggestions in modifying the methodology as indicated in the paper 
well documented by Brown and Warner (1985).  
 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) discussed the steps involved in the event study 
methodology. These steps include choosing the interested event of which in this case 
the event refers to dividends and share repurchase announcements. Campbell et al. 
(1997) also indicated that an event window will be analysed also eliminating the 
confounding events during the event window. Campbell et al. (1997) also indicated 
that the time issue is of vital importance as well as forecasting the normal return in the 
event window period without the material event. Some of these major steps that were 
applied in this study will be discussed in the next section.  
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3.6.2 Event window 
Event Study method has been applied overtime to determine the impact of events on 
the share price since 1968 (Ball & Brown, 1968; Fama et al.1969). The tool will unlock 
the analysis of the dividends and share repurchase announcements on the share 
price.  
 
The event window period refers to the analysis of an impact caused by the event 
before the event and the days after the event. There have been quite a number of 
arguments regarding the length of the window period and there has not been a 
conclusion on the matter. Brown and Warner (1985) in their modification of the event 
study methodology indicated that the dangers of having a long event window period 
are that chances a very high that there will be different events taking place in the same 
window period. These different events are quite a challenge to eliminate as they have 
a material impact also on the share price. 
 
Nageswara and Srejith (2014) indicated that most of the compounding events affecting 
the event window period include joint venture announcements, earnings declarations, 
administration changes and mergers and acquisitions of a company. These 
compounding events have a material impact on the share price and might distort the 
goal of the research. Nageswara and Srejith (2014) indicated that a short event 
window might eliminate the confounding effects of other major announcements. On 
the other hand Lin et al. (2011) indicated that a short event window period might be 
detrimental to the research because it might lessen the predictive power of the 
forecasting model. Nageswara and Srejith (2014) advised that confounding events in 
a study can be eliminated by the collection and the analysis of the company’s events 
around the event window period. Through this exercise the events were determined 
and excluded in the study. 
 
The event window in this research study was 25 days before the announcements and 
25 days after the announcement. This is referred to as T-25 and T+25 in the figure 
below. This announcement referred to the share repurchases and dividends 
announcements as the study will report the outcomes on both announcements. The 
announcement day is indicated as day “0” and is indicated by the red bold line in the 
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diagram below. The event window period that was used in this research study was 51 
days and it is shown in figure 1.  
 
Pre-Announcement Period        Event       Post Announcement Period 
   
 
 
 T-25                                   T-5               0            T+5                                     T+25           
 
Figure 1: Event Window 
Source: Own Deductions 
3.7 Data analysis 
There are three methods documented to calculate expected returns namely the mean 
adjusted return, market adjusted returns and the CAPM adjusted return (Zhang, 2005).  
Lin et al. (2011) indicated that the expected return denoted by Rit is the yardstick return 
in a normal situation without any events. The expected return will be compared to the 
company’s actual return during the event window period. The yardstick return 
represents a normal situation not associated with any events that might interest stake 
holders. The three models of calculating the expected return will be discussed below.  
3.7.1 Mean Adjusted Return 
Lambertides (2009) indicated that the mean adjusted return as the term suggests is 
the average return over the estimation sample period. As a result the mean return 
calculated was used as the company’s normal expected return with no association to 
material events.  The formula is shown below as: 
                 E(Rit) = R 
Where E(Rit) refers to the expected return and R refers to the average return 
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3.7.2 Market adjusted return 
Webber (2009) noted that the market adjusted return is the expected return at the 
same sample period of time assuming that all shares in the entire exchange on 
average generates the same return. It should be noted that in the market adjusted 
return method there is no estimation required. The formula is shown below: 
    E(Rit) = Rmt 
Where E(Rit) refers to the expected return and Rmt refers to the market adjusted 
return. 
 
3.7.3 Market model adjusted return 
In the market model adjusted return the expected return is calculated using a single 
factor model that applies Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis over the 
estimated period.  In share repurchases and special dividends announcements this 
method is used to control the relationship between share returns and market returns 
(Homan, 2006). Homan (2006) also indicated that the regression analysis method is 
a preferred method because it allows for the risk associated with the share to vary. 
The formula for the market adjusted return model is indicated below. 
E(Rit) = a + BRmt 
Where E(Rit) refers to the expected return and Rmt refers to the market adjusted 
return. 
3.7.4 CAPM adjusted return 
This model is also used to calculate the required rate of return for any asset that is 
risky. In this model the required rate is the increase that is experienced based on the 
risk that is inherent on the asset (De Cesari et al., 2011). In formula terms the 
expected return will be the outcome of the risk-free rate return plus market risk 
premium. It is expressed in the formula below. 
ra = rrf + Ba (rm-rrf) 
rrf = the rate of return for a risk-free security  
rm = the broad market's expected rate of return  
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Ba = beta of the asset 
 
Graphically the CAPM model is shown below. 
 
Figure 2: CAPM Model, Source: Yearmach (1997) 
 
3.7.5 Calculation of abnormal returns 
An abnormal return is the difference between the actual return experienced by a 
company’s share over a certain window period and the return that is normally expected 
by the market (Santos and Victorio, 2010). The expected return in the study was 
calculated from the CAPM model as already discussed above. CAPM is a more 
plausible method to calculate abnormal returns because it adjusts the market value by 
the risk associated to the share price of a company.  
In simple form the normal expected returns are calculated from the JSE All share 
index‘s return adjusted for the risk of a particular share. If the abnormal return is 
positive this implies that the share of the company performed better than the market 
(Lin et al, 2011). In the study this was most likely caused by the event that caused a 
material shift in the share price. A negative abnormal return will obviously imply that 
the share performed badly as compared to the market (Lin et al, 2011).  
The return per share was calculated by using the formula indicated below that was 
also applied by Miller and Ward (2011). 
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Rit = ln [Pt / Pt-1]  
 
 
Where Rit = the share price return for company i on day t and  
Pt = closing share price for company i on day t  
Pt-1= the closing share price of the company i on day t-1 
 
The abnormal return was calculated by deducting the expected or required return 
(Kt) from the actual return of the share price (Rt). The difference was likely to be 
positive or negative or no difference at all. The result indicated the impact of the 
event on the share price. 
  
Where:  
ARt = Abnormal return 
Rt = the share price return for company i on day t and  
Kt = the expected return for company i on day t and  
 
The abnormal returns calculated using the formula above was averaged to 
determine the average abnormal return of the firms studied in the events being 
researched in this study by using the formula below. 
 
AARt = ARt/N  
Where:  
AARt = average abnormal return at time t  
N = number of companies 
The study analysed the cumulated average abnormal return (CAAR) and it was 
calculated as indicated below by summing all the average abnormal returns from the 
beginning of the event till the end of it as suggested by (Serra, 2002). 
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Where:  
CAAR = cumulative average abnormal return  
L = length of the event window  
Nageswara and Srejith (2014) indicated that individual cumulated abnormal returns 
(CAR) for companies should be calculated and be plotted on the line graph. The author 
went further indicating that the companies that had cumulated abnormal returns that 
deviated from the rest of the companies should be eliminated in calculating the CAAR 
as it is likely that they were influenced by confounding events not part of the study.  
3.8 Validity and reliability of data 
The study focused on the impact of dividends and share repurchase announcements 
on the share price. There was a great likelihood that unrelated events might also affect 
the share price in the days surrounding the announcement days. These unrelated 
events include financial reports, trade results and corporate actions. Companies 
affected by these unrelated share price movers were eliminated from the study in order 
to get unbiased results.  
 
The event window was critically examined to determine such factors and eliminate 
them. The data is reliable because the companies in the study are listed on the JSE 
and it is a requirement that the companies announce material information that affect 
the share price through SENS. 
 
3.8.1 Validity of measurement 
The share price of all Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies were regarded 
as the unit of analysis from the FTSE/JSE All Share Index. Companies that delisted 
on the JSE in the period understudy were excluded from the sample that was used to 
generate conclusions. Event study was used to measure the impact of the special 
dividends and share repurchases announcements. Event study method was the valid 
measurement in this study as it analyses the share prices before the announcement 
and after the announcement and comparing the two to determine the impact.  
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3.9 Ethical considerations  
Ethics play a pivotal role in research as they lead to reliable results. In this study, codes 
of ethics were strictly adhered to. The data collection and the analysis process were 
handled in a professional manner. The results were not mined to reach the conclusion 
the researcher expected.   
3.9.1 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Anonymity and confidentiality applied only to the gathered data considered inside 
information that is not yet public. However in this study there was no company that 
was singled out in the analysis section but the entire market and industry.   The privacy 
of companies does not apply in this case as data was collected in public institutions 
as a result confidentiality in this case will not apply. All the companies considered in 
the population and in the sample were listed on the JSE and the announcements of 
special dividends and share repurchases was collected through SENS which is a 
public institution. The share prices of the companies in the study were collected 
through I-net Bridge and McGregor BFA of which are all public information as a result 
anonymity and confidentiality does not apply in this study.  
3.10 Limitations 
The research on share repurchases announcements and dividends announcements 
focussed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies. As a result this study 
might be applicable to only companies that are public listed in South Africa and might 
not necessarily apply in private companies. The study focussed on the period 1 
October 1999 to the 31st of December 2015 and the results might not be applied with 
certainty for future events. The market dynamics might have changed and different 
results are likely to be observed as this study focused on historical events. 
 
The data analysis focused on companies that were still listed on JSE for the entire 15 
year period of study. This might expose the study to survivorship bias as it is selective. 
This loophole is for future research to focus on the impact of the events on companies 
that announced share repurchases and dividends but delisted on the JSE 
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3.11 Summary 
The purpose of the study was to determine the effects of share repurchases and 
special dividends on the share prices of JSE listed companies. The study was of 
quantitative nature as historical share prices of companies were gathered through the 
databases I-net Bridge and Mcgregor BFA. The study relied on secondary data 
obtained from SENS. Population in the study referred to all JSE listed companies that 
announced share repurchases and special dividends from the 1 of October 1999 to 30 
of June 2015. A period of 15 years was selected as it reduced small sample bias and 
it also included different phases of the economic cycles in South African market. The 
sample was selected through non-probability sampling. Probability sampling could not 
be used as it posed the risk of selecting companies that had material announcements 
around the events understudy.  
 
A strict guideline in selecting the sample was followed as suggested by Bhana (2007). 
There were no major announcements from the company 30 days before and after the 
announcement period was done in order to be included in the sample. All companies 
included in the sample had data available 200 days before the announcement and 25 
days after the announcement. Companies that reduced dividends in the year of 
announcement were excluded from the sample to eliminate the substitution effect. The 
event study methodology was used to determine the impact of special dividends and 
share repurchase announcements on the share price in the South African market. 
Share price reaction was observed before, on and after the announcements of share 
repurchases and special dividends. Average abnormal returns were observed and 
analysed in the days surrounding the announcements of the events. P-values were 
used to determine the significance of the results observed in the study. 
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Chapter 4 
Results and findings
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data collected from the companies listed on the JSE in 
regards to impacts caused by special dividend and share repurchase announcements. 
The population and the sample will be discussed and how they were generated. Share 
repurchases and special dividend announcements will be compared and contrasted in 
this section as they are tools of free cash flow distribution to the shareholders. Previous 
studies indicated in the literature review section that there has been a surge in share 
repurchases and a decline in companies distributing free cash-flow through special 
dividends. The finding will be tested in this section. 
 
4.2 Description of the population 
The data was collected from the JSE listed companies from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 
2015. The historic share price was collected through McGregor BFA and I-net Bridge.  
The special dividends and share repurchase announcements dates were gathered 
from the SENS. The share prices were collected 25 days prior the announcement day 
and the next 25 days post announcement period. The generation of the share 
repurchases and special dividends population will be discussed in the next section. A 
contrast will be done to determine whether share repurchases have replaced special 
dividend announcements in distributing free cash flow. 
 
4.2.1 Share repurchase population 
There were 747 share repurchase announcements from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 
2015 as indicated in table 1. The announcements considered in the table are only for 
companies listed on the JSE. The table indicates that most of the share repurchase 
announcements were done in the month of June as there were 12% announcements.  
 
 
51 
 
   
Share repurchase population 
   
              
  Jan Feb  Mar Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 9 
2000 0 2 3 1 2 10 5 6 8 7 8 14 66 
2001 6 4 12 8 4 12 6 7 7 9 4 3 82 
2002 6 10 10 7 8 3 6 5 6 5 6 11 83 
2003 4 6 3 5 10 11 2 4 4 1 2 1 53 
2004 1 3 2 3 4 5 3 0 2 2 6 2 33 
2005 3 1 1 4 2 4 1 3 0 2 4 2 27 
2006 2 4 3 1 1 4 5 1 2 1 4 2 30 
2007 0 0 3 1 1 7 2 6 2 2 5 4 33 
2008 0 12 7 1 3 7 6 5 6 2 3 4 56 
2009 0 6 6 1 4 5 2 4 3 2 1 2 36 
2010 0 4 0 3 0 1 0 7 2 0 3 6 26 
2011 2 3 1 1 2 4 2 3 0 3 2 3 26 
2012 0 3 3 1 1 4 10 6 4 1 7 6 46 
2013 1 6 6 1 3 6 3 8 3 4 4 7 52 
2014 7 8 8 4 2 2 3 5 7 4 4 7 61 
2015 1 11 5 2 2 7             28 
Total 33 83 73 44 49 92 56 70 58 45 66 78 747 
              
              
Table 2: Share repurchases population 
Source: Own deductions 
The graph in figure 3 indicates that the highest share repurchase announcements 
were done in the years 2001 and 2002. The years experienced 82 (1.10%) and 83 
(1.11%) share repurchase announcements respectively. The increase observed in the 
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early years in share repurchase announcements might be that companies were now 
accustomed to the new method of distributing free cash-flow as share repurchase 
announcements in South Africa were only legalized in 1999.  
 
One dimension that could be attributed to the surge in share repurchase 
announcements is the strength of the economy as there is likely to be a surplus in 
such a period and free cash-flow is distributed to shareholders. The graph in Figure 4 
depicts the history of the South African Rand to the US Dollar. In 2001 and 2002 the 
exchange rate to the US Dollar was between R6 - R7.50 
 
Figure 3: Share repurchases announcements 
Source: Own deductions 
 
The graph in Figure 4 indicates that share repurchase announcements were in their 
lowest in the year 2009, 2010 and 2011. The reduction in share repurchase 
announcements can be due to the subprime lending that affected the world economy 
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in 2008-2010. The ZAR/US$ graph also indicates the spike in 2009 when the 
exchange rate was close to R11.03 to the US$.  In this period only 26 share 
repurchase announcements were made in the year 2010 and 2011. The observation 
highlights that when the Rand value was strong compared to the US$, a huge number 
of share repurchases were announced. A small number of announcements were 
observed when the Rand value had depreciated. 
 
Figure 4: Exchange Rate ZAR/USD 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
4.2.2 Special dividends population 
The special dividend announcements for JSE listed companies were collected from 
the SENS. The announcements covers the period 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. 
The period is the same as a comparison will be done in the next Section 4.2.3 to 
determine if share repurchases have surpassed or replaced special dividends in 
distributing free cash-flow.  
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Table 2 below indicates a total of 211 special dividends announcements in the study 
period by the JSE listed companies. There were few special dividend announcements 
in the study period as compared to share repurchase announcements. 
   
Special Dividends Population 
   
              
  Jan Feb  Mar  Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
1999               2 2 0 0 0 4 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
2001 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2   5 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2   2 
2004 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2005 1 2 0 0 0 2 3 5 0 0 1 0 14 
2006 1 2 1 0 0 5 2 6 4 0 6 1 28 
2007 0 6 1 0 1 7 0 2 2 1 5 5 30 
2008 0 0 3 0 5 1 0 3 3 1 6 5 27 
2009 1 0 2 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 16 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 1 0 1 11 
2011 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 8 0 0 1 12 
2012 0 0 4 5 2 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 17 
2013 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 12 
2014 2 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 1 5 0 18 
2015 2 1 2 1 1               7 
Total 7 16 15 17 15 26 15 25 20 4 37 14 211 
              
Table 3: Special dividend population 
Source: Own deductions 
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The graph in Figure 5 depicts that special dividends were at their lowest levels in the 
years 1999-2004. They were in their highest level in the year 2007 where only 30 
special dividends were announced. This could be explained by the strength 
experienced by the South African currency in the years 2004 - 2006.  
 
In 2007 the South African currency was depreciating as compared to the American 
dollar. Signalling theory could be the answer to this observation. As the currency was 
losing value, companies would have used special dividends as tool to inform the 
markets about the brighter future positive economic years to gain confidence from 
shareholders. 
 
 
Figure 5: Special dividend announcements 
Source: Own deductions 
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4.2.3 Comparison of share repurchases and special dividends 
As discussed in the Literature Review section there is quite a number of inconclusive 
evidence in regards to share repurchase replacing special dividends as a means of 
distributing free cash-flow surplus. This section will compare and contrast the share 
repurchase and special dividends announcements by using the population data.  
 
In the study there were a total number of share repurchase announcements of 747 as 
compared to the total number of 211 special dividends. The highest announcements 
of share repurchases in a single year were 83 while only 30 maximum special 
dividends were observed in a single year. This clearly highlights that share 
repurchases were by a large margin utilized in South Africa in the period October 1999 
- June 2015.  
 
The tables above indicate that in the early years after share repurchases were 
legalized in South Africa there were very few special dividends announcements. Three 
special dividends on average were announced in the years 1999 to 2004. On the other 
hand share repurchase announcements experienced a surge in the early years of the 
study. On average in the year’s 1999 to 2004 share repurchase announcements were 
54 in South Africa. This is a huge number compared to special dividend 
announcements of 3. 
 
A large number of companies utilised share repurchase programmes in the years 1999 
to 2004. Another reason could be that the share repurchases were a fairly new 
programme that was only legalized in October 1999. Companies could have been 
prompted to try the new method of distributing free cash-flow to the shareholders. 
 
The global market experienced a financial crisis in 2007 - 2008 due to subprime 
lending that also affected South Africa in 2009 to 2010. Share repurchases 
experienced a huge drop of 55.5 % in 2009 and dropped by 38.4% in 2010. Special 
dividends were also affected by the recession in South Africa as only 11 special 
dividends were announced. The observation from the generated population indicated 
that share repurchases and special dividends announcements are positively related 
to the Economic cycles. During the years the economy performed well, there was a 
rise in share repurchases and special dividends and when the economy performed 
badly they both declined. 
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From the data gathered, it can be concluded that South African companies utilize 
share repurchase programmes more than special dividends to distribute free cash-
flow. As the economy was on its way to recovery, share repurchases increased in the 
years 2012 to 2015.   
4.3 Description of the sample 
The sample was generated as indicated in the research methodology. Non-probability 
sampling was used because subjective judgement was required in selecting the 
companies to include in the sample. Subjective judgement was applied in order to 
select companies with continuous trading data as daily time series was used in this 
study. All the companies in the generated sample were listed on the JSE for the 
research period in this study.  
 4.3.1 Share repurchases 
A total number of 197 share repurchase announcements were considered in the 
sample period between October 1999 and June 2015 as shown in Table 3 below. Most 
share repurchase announcements in the sample were done in the month of June as 
there were a total number of 32 announcements. The most number of share 
repurchase announcements were done in 2001.  
 
On the percentage basis the share repurchase announcements made in 2001 
contributed 13% to the sample. Surprisingly the second highest number of share 
repurchase announcements in our sample was in 2008 with 19 announcements 
contributing almost 10% in the sample. It is surprising because the subprime lending 
crisis started in 2007 -2008 in America which affected the markets globally including 
South Africa. The reason most likely is that the impact was delayed in South Africa.   
4.3.2 Special dividends 
Special dividend announcements consist of 89 announcements as shown in table 4 
below. This is a very smaller sample compared to Share repurchase announcements. 
There were few special dividend announcements in the early years mainly due to the 
surge in share repurchases in the same period. There are more special dividend 
announcements in the year 2006 than any other year in the sample period.  
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Share repurchase announcements sample 
 
    
  Jan Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec  Total 
1999               1       1 2 
2000   1       4 1 1 1 2 2 7 19 
2001 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 5 3   1 26 
2002   1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1   1 2 13 
2003 1 1 2 2 4 2 1 1     2 1 17 
2004   1 1   2 3 1       2 1 11 
2005   1 1 1   2 1 2   2 1   11 
2006 1   2 1 1 4 2 1 1     1 14 
2007           4   2 1   1   8 
2008 3 1   1 1 3 1 2 3 2 2   19 
2009     2   1 1   1     1 1 7 
2010   2   1   1         2   6 
2011   2   1   2   2   1 1 1 10 
2012     1       1 1 1   2 2 8 
2013   2 3   1 1       1 1   9 
2014   3 2 1     1     2   2 11 
2015   2 1   2 1             6 
                          0 
Total 6 19 17 12 16 32 13 18 13 13 18 20 197 
              
              
Table 4: Share repurchase announcements sample 
Source: Own deductions 
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4.4 Analysis of data 
4.4.1 Share repurchase 
The study focused on a sample of share repurchases announcements totalling 197. 
The table in appendix 1 indicates different sectors that announced share repurchases 
in the sample study period. The most share repurchase announcements in the sample 
were in the retail sector with 36 announcements. The financial sector has the second 
highest number of share repurchases with 23 announcements. The Mining, 
Transportation and Construction sectors have both 14 share repurchase 
announcements as indicated appendix 1. 
 
  Special dividends final sample 
  Jan Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
1999                 2       2 
2000                     1   1 
2001   1                 1   2 
2002                         0 
2003                     1   1 
2004   1                     1 
2005           2 1 3     1   7 
2006   2 1     2 1 3 1   3   13 
2007         2 2   1   1 2   8 
2008         1 1 2 1   1     6 
2009 1   1 1 2 1 1       1   8 
2010   1       2   2   1   1 7 
2011         2     1   2   1 6 
2012       1 2 1 2       1   7 
2013     1 1   1         2 1 6 
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2014   1   2   1   1     4   9 
2015 1 1 1 1 1               5 
Total 2 7 4 6 10 13 7 12 3 5 17 3 89 
Table 5: Special dividends final sample 
Source: Own deductions 
4.4.1.1 Average abnormal returns 
The initial step in event studies is to calculate the abnormal returns of the sampled 
companies. The abnormal returns were calculated as indicated in the previous 
chapter. The study focused on the abnormal returns of share repurchases announced 
by South African companies that are listed on JSE. As a result the study focussed on 
the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) of the sampled companies listed on the JSE. 
 
The abnormal average returns on table 5 highlights positive abnormal returns from the 
first day after the announcement. Negative abnormal returns were observed two days 
before the announcement date and the date of the announcement. Negative returns 
of 0.108% were experienced on the announcement day. On day T+01 positive 
abnormal returns of 0.439% were experienced indicating the signalling theory.  
 
Signalling theory states that share prices tend to underperform before the 
announcement day and positively perform after the date of the announcement. 
However the share prices experienced a negative abnormal return of 0.113% on the 
second day after the announcement day. 
     
T-02 T-01 T0 T+1 T+2 
-0.00419 
 
-0.00263 
 
-0.00108 
 
0.004388 
 
-0.00113 
 
 
Table 6: Abnormal returns analysis for share repurchases announcements 
Source: Own deductions 
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The graph in figure 6 depicts the average abnormal returns on the entire window period 
from T-25 to T+25. The shares experienced rising abnormal returns from T-25 to T-21 
as indicated in the graph below. The shares experienced a decline in abnormal returns 
from T-11 to T-09. The results are inconsistent from T-25 to T-04 as they oscillate 
between negative and positive abnormal returns.  
 
As indicated in the table 5 above the shares underperformed from T-02 to T0 which is 
the announcement day. Positive abnormal returns were experienced on days T+1, 
T+3, T+4 and T5. A spike of 3.652% in positive abnormal returns was experienced in 
the 4th day after the announcements. The results are inconsistent from T+6 to T+25.     
 
The 5 day window period indicate increasing abnormal returns which are in support of 
the signalling theory. The results indicate that South African companies announce 
share repurchases when share prices are undervalued. In figure the abnormal returns 
are negative from 2 days prior until the announcement day. From the first day after the 
announcement till day 5 positive abnormal returns were observed indicting the 
signalling theory.  
 
On average in the 5 days after the announcement day, 4.962% abnormal returns were 
observed. The result should be treated with care due to the spike observed on the 4th 
day after the announcement as indicated in Figure 6. Excluding the 4th day after the 
announcement, 0.586% average abnormal returns were experienced. The result is 
consistent with the signalling theory that was discussed above. The significance of the 
results will be examined below. 
4.4.1.2 Cumulative average abnormal returns 
The graph in figure 8 indicates the Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for 
the sample in the window period from T-25 to T+25. Share prices were slowly 
increasing before the event day T0 indicating the signalling theory. The share prices 
decreased from T-06 to T-04 before the announcement day indicating that share 
prices are undervalued. The share prices drastically increased on the event day and 
the following day. On day T+3 share price decrease till day T+5 and increase upwards 
from T+5. It can be concluded that share prices are undervalued before the event and 
increase after the announcement day indicating the signalling theory.  
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Figure 6: Abnormal returns analysis  
Source: Own deductions 
 
4.4.1.3 Significance of Share repurchase AAR results 
The abnormal returns observed around the announcement day of share repurchase 
were tested for significance. A paired comparison test was used in the study as it is 
perfectly applied in observations that are dependent and compare observations before 
and after a major event. The t-test for mean differences was used to determine the 
significance of the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR).  
 
The E-views package was also used in getting the p-value to determine for rejection 
or acceptance level at the significance level of α=0.05. If the p-value is less than 
α=0.05 it means that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level. However 
if the p-value is more than α=0.05 it means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Figure 7: Average abnormal returns 
Source: Own deductions  
 
Table 7 below displays the output from the t-test calculations. The t-test statistic is less 
than the critical level of 2.064 at 24 degrees of freedom. This implies that the positive 
average abnormal returns observed above are not significant at 5% significance level 
and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
4.4.2 Special Dividends 
Special dividend announcements consisted of 89 announcements. This is a small 
sample due to the fact that there were few special dividends announcement on the 
JSE listed companies. The other contributing factor is that only companies listed on 
the JSE for the entire study period were considered. Most special dividend 
announcements were experienced in the financial services sectors with 13 and 12 
announcements respectively. The list of all companies on the sample by sector are 
indicated in Appendix 2. 
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.  
Figure 8: Cumulated average abnormal returns 
Source: Own deductions 
 
 
t-statistic Degrees of freedom Critical level 
0.3594 24 2.064 
 
Table 7: Significance analysis 
Source: Own deductions  
 
 
 
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
T-
2
5
T-
2
2
T-
1
9
T-
1
6
T-
1
3
T-
1
0
T-
0
7
T-
0
4
T-
0
1
T+
2
T+
5
T+
8
T+
1
1
T+
1
4
T+
1
7
T+
2
0
T+
2
3
Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns
Cumulated Average Abnormal
Returns
 
65 
 
4.4.2.1 Average abnormal returns 
The average abnormal returns were calculated for the entire sample and are indicated 
on the graph in figure 9. Abnormal returns for individual companies could not be 
interpreted individually as such would be a tedious process as 89 special dividends 
announcements were sampled. As a result for simplicity of analysis and application 
AAR was used instead.  
 
Figure 9: Average abnormal returns 
Source: Own deductions 
 
The graph in Figure 9 above indicates that shares performed better before the event 
as compared to after special dividend announcements. On average positive abnormal 
returns of 0.154% were observed in the 25 days prior to the announcement as 
compared to the negative abnormal returns of -0.202% 25 days after special dividend 
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announcement. The results indicate that special dividends in South Africa are contrary 
to the signalling theory as the shares prior the announcement performed better than 
the post announcement period. 
 
A 2-day window period was considered to get a closer look at abnormal returns in the 
days surrounding the announcement day. The results in table 7 are in favour of the 
signalling theory as shares underperformed prior to the announcement as compared 
to the post announcement period. Positive abnormal returns of 1.21% were 
experienced a day before the announcement which might mean that the market could 
have anticipated the announcement a day before.   
     
T-02 T-01 Event T+01 T+02 
-0.298391565 1.21001627 0.257725499 0.4553553 0.10346 
     
 Table 8: Average abnormal analysis 
  Source: Own deductions 
 
On the announcement day positive abnormal returns of 0.26 were experienced. Two 
days after the announcement also experienced abnormal returns of 0.46% and 0.10% 
respectively. The graph in figure 10 depicts the performance of shares in the 2 day 
window period. The shares performed positively and experienced abnormal returns in 
4 days as shown in figure. This might be in support of the signalling theory during the 
days surrounding the announcement day.  
4.4.2.2 Cumulated average abnormal returns 
Figure 11 below shows the CAAR before and after special dividends were announced 
in the window period from T-25 to T+25. The cumulated average abnormal returns 
were on the rise from T-25 to T-22 and slightly decreased from T-21 to T-18. The share 
price performance rose from T-13 until the special dividend announcement on T-0.  
 
 
67 
 
 
Figure 10: Abnormal returns 
Source: Own deductions 
 
The positive increase towards the announcement day is consistent with the signalling 
theory if cumulated average abnormal returns continue to rise even after the 
announcement date. Surprisingly CAAR start decreasing after the 2nd day after the 
announcement. CAAR continue decreasing until the end of the window period. CAAR 
increased on Day T+9, T+13 and T+17 but the increases were temporary as the 
returns decreased until the end of the window period. The special dividend 
announcement in the sample period does not indicate the signalling theory as share 
prices fell gradually after the announcement. 
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Figure 11: Cumulated average abnormal returns 
Source: Own deductions 
 
Table 8 below indicates that though special dividend announcement does not validate 
the signalling theory as explained above positive abnormal returns were experienced 
around the announcement days of special dividends. A day before the announcement 
day T-01, 1.351% positive cumulated average abnormal returns were experienced. It 
should be noted also that on average on the announcement day, 0.250% CAAR were 
experienced. Two days after the announcement date also experienced positive CAAR 
of 0.46% and 0.10%. It can be concluded from the study that the share price increase 
only occurred on the days surrounding the announcement date. The positive returns 
are temporary around the announcement date. 
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T-02 T-01 T0 T+1 T+2 
-0.298391565 1.210016275 0.257725499 0.455355324 0.10346 
 
Table 9: 4 day window period 
Source: Own deductions 
4.4.2.3 Significance of special dividend announcements AAR results 
Figure 11 below shows the CAAR before and after special dividends were announced 
in the window period from T-25 to T+25.The abnormal returns observed around the 
special dividend announcement day were tested for significance. A paired comparison 
test was used to determine if the results were significant. The t-test for mean 
differences was used to determine the significance of the Average Abnormal Returns 
(AAR).  
 
The table below indicates the output from the t-test calculations. The t-test statistic is 
less than the critical level of 2.064 at 24 degrees of freedom. This implies that the 
positive average abnormal returns observed around the special dividends 
announcements above are not significant at 5% significance level and the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
t-statistic Degrees of freedom Critical level 
1.7690 24 2.064 
 
Table 10: Significance analysis 
Source: Own deductions 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter the population and the sample were discussed in detail. The study on 
share repurchases focussed on a total of 747 share repurchase announcements of 
which 197 share repurchases were sampled. The population of special dividend 
announcements was 211 of which 89 announcements were sampled. 
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The results from the event studies on share repurchase and dividends announcements 
were also reviewed and analysed. Abnormal returns, Average Abnormal returns and 
Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns were also analysed. The AAR was tested for 
significance using the paired comparison test.  
  
Negative abnormal returns of 0.108% were observed on the announcement day of 
share repurchases. On the announcement day of special dividends positive abnormal 
returns of 0.26% were observed. However, at 95% confidence level the results were 
found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
The AR on share repurchase announcements was positive as well as the CAAR. Both 
the AAR and CAAR were in support of the signalling theory as shares underperformed 
before announcement and over performed on the announcement day and after the 
announcement day. The observations were tested for significance and were found to 
be insignificant as the null hypothesis was not rejected.  
 
The AR, AAR and CAAR on dividends announcements were generally negative and 
were in direct opposite of the signalling theory. Share prices performed better on the 
pre-announcement compare to the post announcement in the sample period. The 
results were tested for significance and the null hypothesis could not be rejected at 
5% level of significance. 
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Chapter 5 
Findings, conclusion and recommendation
 
5.1 Introduction 
The study was conducted to determine the effects of share repurchases and special 
dividends on the share price of JSE listed companies. A period of 15 years spanning 
from 1 October 1999 – 30 June 2015 was considered as it eliminated small sample 
bias. Average abnormal returns before, during and after the global recession were 
analysed after the announcement of share repurchases and special dividends. In 
previous studies share repurchases were observed to be on the rise and dividends on 
the decline (Lee & Suh, 2011). It was observed that many companies in South Africa 
engaged in share repurchases than distributing free cash flow through special 
dividends. The signalling theory was more prevalent in the study as companies that 
underperformed in the JSE announced that they will engage in share repurchases 
programmes. The tax effect also played a role in companies engaging in share 
repurchases than special dividends as capital gains tax is less than dividend tax. 
 
The reasons for undertaking the research will be discussed in Section 5.2 and the 
summary of the findings will be discussed in section 5.3. Discussion of the findings will 
be covered in section 5.4 as well as the contribution of the study in finance in section 
5.5. The limitations and the final recommendations of the study will be discussed in 
section 5.6 and 5.7 respectively. The final remarks will conclude the chapter and the 
study in section 5.8. 
 
 5.2 Reasons for undertaking the research 
The main objective of the study was to determine the impact of share repurchase and 
special dividends on the share price of JSE listed companies. Studies were conducted 
previously in South Africa but the sample period was very small. As a result the study 
focussed on a sample period from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015.   
 
The study also compared the number of share repurchase announcements to special 
dividends as previous studies indicated that share repurchase are now more popular 
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than special dividends. There has been limited literature in the studies conducted in 
South Africa comparing share repurchases and special dividends announcements. 
Most of the studies were conducted in developed countries such as United States, 
Canada and Europe. The study’s objective was to bridge the gap between developed 
countries and emerging markets on the reaction of the different markets.  
5.3 Summary of the findings 
The aim of the study was to determine the effects of share repurchases and special 
dividends on the share price for the JSE listed companies for the period 1999 - 2015. 
There were 747 share repurchase announcements in the study period while there 
were 211 special dividends. The event study methodology was utilised to generate the 
results. 
 
Positive average abnormal returns were experienced in the days around the 
announcement of share repurchases. The results were in support of the signalling 
theory as negative average abnormal returns were experienced prior to the 
announcement of share repurchases.  The cumulated average abnormal returns 
indicated positive abnormal returns. The result was also in support of the signalling 
theory. However all the observations were insignificant and the hypothesis could not 
be rejected. 
 
On average negative abnormal returns were observed in the sample event window 
period for special dividends. Graphically it was noted that shares performed better 
before special dividends were announced as compared to the post announcement. 
Positive abnormal returns were observed in the 5 day window period including the 
announcement day.  The CAAR increased until the special dividend announcement 
and decreased afterwards indicating that shares performed better in pre-
announcement than in the post-announcement. The special dividends observations 
were tested for significance and were found to be insignificant and the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected.  
 
5.4 Discussion of the findings 
The entire population in the study had 747 share repurchase announcements and 211 
special dividend announcements. Non probability sampling methods were used to 
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generate the sample. The samples consisted of 197 share repurchase 
announcements that were selected and a total of 89 special dividends announcements 
were considered. The results from the two samples were generated separately. 
Though the study spanned for a 15 year period, the number of companies that 
announced share repurchases in the South African market was lower than in the US 
market. However, it was noted that a number of South African companies distribute 
free cash flow through share repurchases compared to special dividends. The South 
African market violated the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis as investors 
reacted to public material announcements leading to positive average abnormal 
returns in the days surrounding the announcements. If the semi-strong efficient 
hypothesis, held the announcements of special dividends and share repurchases 
would have been incorporated in the market share price not leading to abnormal 
returns. These results are consistent with the findings reported by Bhana (2007), 
however when tested for significance they were found to be insignificant.  
 
Most companies that announced share repurchases underperformed before the 
announcements and outperformed after the announcements indicating the signalling 
theory. The results are consistent with the findings reported by Hennessy et al. (2010). 
The results of the study namely CAAR, AAR and significance of the results were 
discussed in this section. Event study methodology was applied to arrive at the results. 
The global market in 2007-2008 experienced a financial crisis due to subprime lending 
which also affected the South African market. The financial crisis was strongly felt in 
South Africa between 2009 and 2010. Companies engaging in share repurchase 
during the financial crisis decreased by 55.5% in 2009 and 38.4% in 2010. Special 
dividends announcements also dropped by 68.75% in 2009 and 45.45% in 2010. 
Special dividend announcements were largely affected compared to share 
repurchases announcements. The results indicated that share repurchases and 
special dividends in South Africa are positively related to economic cycles.  
 
5.4.1 Average abnormal returns 
Positive abnormal returns were observed during and after share repurchase 
announcements. The results indicated that the market responds positively to share 
repurchase announcements. On the announcement day of share repurchases 
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negative abnormal returns of -0.108% were observed. The market delayed by a day 
to react to the share repurchase announcements as abnormal returns of 0.439% were 
observed a day after the announcement positive. On the 4th day positive abnormal 
returns of 3.65% were observed. Outliers were checked and the result is valid and 
reliable. Shares underperformed before the announcement when compared to the 
post-announcement. The result were in support of the signalling theory indicating that 
companies utilise share repurchases as a communication tool to inform investors 
about the greater years ahead. 
 
Negative abnormal returns were experienced in the analysis of special dividends 
announcements on average in the 25 day window period. Shares performed better 
before the special dividends as compared to the post-announcement period. However 
on the announcement day 0.26% abnormal returns were observed. This indicates that 
the investors react positively to the announcement of special dividends. Positive 
abnormal returns of 0.439% and negative abnormal returns of 0.113 % were also 
observed on the first and second day after the announcement day. Negative abnormal 
returns were observed after the second day indicating that the positive returns are only 
temporary and around the announcement day. 
 
Special dividends and share repurchase announcements exhibit positive returns on 
the days surrounding the announcement day. The results from share repurchases are 
in support of the signalling theory as negative abnormal returns were observed before 
the announcement and positive abnormal returns were observed after the 
announcement. 
 
5.4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns 
The CAAR reacted positively to share repurchase announcements. The result was in 
support of the signalling theory as shares performed better after share repurchases 
were announced. CAAR were also positive on the announcement day also indicating 
that the market reacts positively to the announcements of share repurchases. 
 
Positive CAAR were observed on the announcement day and the two days after the 
special dividend announcement. It was depicted in the graph that after the second day 
negative abnormal returns were observed indicating that the positive abnormal returns 
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were temporary. Shares performed better in the pre-special dividend announcement. 
This might be due to the fact that investors interpret it negatively as a sign that 
companies are not utilising surplus cash in projects that would add value. 
5.4.3 Significance of the results 
The null hypotheses for both special dividends and share repurchase were tested for 
significance.   
H0: Abnormal returns on the special dividend announcement day are zero 
H1: Abnormal returns on the special dividend announcement day are not zero 
 
H0: Abnormal returns on the share repurchase announcement day are zero 
H1: Abnormal returns on the share repurchase announcement day are not zero 
Abnormal returns were found to be insignificant indicating that the null hypotheses 
could not be rejected at 5% significance level for both special dividends and share 
repurchases. This means that the abnormal returns are zero on the announcement 
day.  
 
5.5 Contribution of the study 
The study adds a new dimension to the financial markets as it compares the impact of 
share repurchase and special dividends announcements on the share price. A number 
of studies have been conducted in South Africa on analysing the impact of special 
dividends and share repurchase announcements on the share price. Based on the 
observations gathered in the study, investors can alter their investment strategies to 
reap rewards when companies announce such programmes.  
 
The market reacted positively to share repurchase announcements. The firms can use 
the share repurchase programmes as a communication tool when they believe the 
share price is undervalued. On special dividends announcements firms should be wary 
as in overall the market reacted negatively. The reason could be lack of profitable 
projects that investors interpret negatively. 
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5.6 Limitations 
The sample focussed only on companies that were listed on the JSE for the entire 
sample period from 1 October 1999 to 30 June 2015. This criterion might lead to 
survivorship bias. The special dividend sample was very small due to the lack of data. 
The result can be different in a larger sample. The study focussed on general share 
repurchase announcements as data is not readily available as compared to the 
developed countries. Future studies can focus on specific types of share repurchases 
namely open market, tender offer and Dutch auction.  Finally the study focussed on 
the impacts of share repurchase and special dividends announcements on the share 
price. The study did not focus on the reasons why there is a reaction. 
 
5.7 Recommendations for further research 
The future studies might focus on all the companies that announced share 
repurchases and special dividends regardless of whether they were listed on the JSE 
for the sample period. By eliminating survivorship bias the special dividends sample 
is likely to be larger than the one used in the study. A larger special dividend sample 
might yield different results.  
 
5.8 Final remarks 
The main aim of the study was to determine the impact of special dividends and share 
repurchase announcements on the share price. There were a large number of share 
repurchase announcements as compared to the special dividends. The study indicates 
that in South Africa companies distribute free cash flow through share repurchases 
than through special dividends.  A huge decrease of companies announcing share 
repurchases were observed during the global recession of 2008.  
 
Shares underperformed on the announcement day of share repurchases and on the 
second day after the announcement day. Share outperformed the market from the 3rd 
day after share repurchases were announced. Abnormal returns of 3.652% were 
observed on the 4th day after share repurchase announcements. On average 
abnormal returns of 4.963% were observed in the first 5 days after share repurchase 
announcements. The results were tested for significance at 95% confidence level and 
were found to be insignificant. 
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On average abnormal returns of 0.154% were observed 25 days prior to the special 
dividends announcements. Negative abnormal returns of -0.202% on average were 
observed 25 days after the announcements of special dividends. The results indicate 
that special dividends do not exhibit the signalling power as share outperformed prior 
the announcement and underperformed after the announcement. However, on the 
announcement day positive abnormal returns of 1.213% were observed on the 
announcement day of special dividends. The results were statistically tested for 
significance at 95% confidence level and were found to be insignificant. As a result the 
null hypotheses could not be rejected. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
                   
Sector 19
99 
20
00 
20
01 
20
02 
20
03 
20
04 
20
05 
20
06 
20
07 
20
08 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
20
14 
20
15 Total 
Life insurance 1           1       1             3 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 1   1     1       1               4 
Software & 
Computer Service   2 2             1 2         1   8 
Mining   1 3       1   1 2       3   2 1 14 
Industrial 
Engineering   3 1     1           1         1 7 
Construction & 
Materials   1 1           1 2 3   4     1   13 
Chemicals   3         1     1               5 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipment   1     1               1     1 1 5 
 Retailers   2 3 7 3 2 3 2 2 3   1 1   6 1   36 
Electronic & 
Electrical 
Equipment   1 2   1 1       1     1         7 
Forestry & Paper   1                               1 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 
  1 2         2 1         1       7 
Food Producers   1         2 2 1     1   1   1   9 
financial services   2 2 6 5 2   3 1 1   1           23 
travel and leisure     1             1               2 
support services     2   1         1       1 1     6 
transportation and 
industrial     5   2 2   1   2   1 1         14 
Health Care and 
Equipment 
Services     1                             1 
General Industrials         2   1 3 1         2     1 10 
Real Estate 
Investment Trusts         1                         1 
AltX         1   1     2 1 1     1 1   8 
Personal Goods           1 1                     2 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunicatio
ns           1   1   1               3 
Tobacco                          2   1 1   4 
Developmental 
Capital                               1   1 
Banks 
                              1 1 2 
Non Life Insurance 
                                1 1 
                                    0 
Total 2 19 26 13 17 11 11 14 8 19 7 6 10 8 9 11 6 197 
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Appendix 2 
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3 
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4 
201
5 
Tot
al 
Chemicals 1           1     1 1           2 6 
Electronic & 
Electrical 
Equipment 1             2                   3 
Financial Services   1 1   1 1 1 2   2     1 2       12 
Mining     1         4   2   1   1   2   11 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunicati
ons             1 1 2   3 1           8 
Banks             3 4         1         8 
General 
Industrials             1   1         1       3 
Real Estate 
Investment Trusts               1 2       1 1 1 1 1 8 
Industrial 
Engineering                 1 1   1   1   1 1 6 
Nonlife Insurance                 1                 1 
Media                 1   1 1           3 
Construction & 
Materials                     2   1   2     5 
AltX                           1   1   2 
Food Producers                       1           1 
Equity Investment 
Instruments                             1 1 1 3 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services                               1   1 
General Retailers                               1   1 
Software & 
Computer 
Services                               1   1 
Industrial 
Transportation                             1     1 
Total 2 1 2 0 1 1 7 14 8 6 7 5 4 7 5 9 5 84 
 
